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INTRODUCTION
In the landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made the
“simple but momentous”1 declaration that it is illegal to deny
employment opportunities to individuals because of their race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.2 Congress has likewise prohibited
discrimination based on age, disability, and other factors,3 and it has
made clear that individuals who complain about unequal treatment
should be protected from retaliation.4 However, academic studies,5
case filings,6 and the groundswell of support for advocacy movements
1. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1741 (2020) (quoting Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (prohibiting discrimination based on age); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112 (prohibiting discrimination based on disability); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-1
(prohibiting discrimination based on genetic information); 38 U.S.C. § 4311
(prohibiting discrimination based on military service).
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
5. See, e.g., Derek R. Avery & Enrica N. Ruggs, Confronting the Uncomfortable
Reality of Workplace Discrimination, MASS. INST. TECH. SLOAN MGMT. REV. (July 14, 2020),
https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/confronting-the-uncomfortable-reality-of
-workplace-discrimination [https://perma.cc/ZU2B-6KTZ] (gathering research
showing widespread racial discrimination in hiring, pay, and downsizing policies);
Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced Sexual
Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2018/02/21/587671849/a-new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have
-experienced-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/AG86-UGCH] (reporting 38% of
women have experienced sexual harassment at work); Elaine H. Ecklund, Denis
Daniels, Daniel Bolger & Laura Johnson, A Nationally Representative Survey of Faith and
Work: Demographic Subgroup Differences Around Calling and Conflict, RELIGIONS (2020)
(reporting 29% of workers, including 54% of Jews and 62% of Muslims, report
experiencing religious discrimination at work); Joe Kita, Workplace Age Discrimination
Still Flourishes in America, AARP (Dec. 30, 2019), https://www.aarp.org/work/
working-at-50-plus/info-2019/age-discrimination-in-america.html [https://perma
.cc/WDP8-AHM7] (reporting 76% of workers over 45 years old perceive age
discrimination as a hurdle to finding a new job).
6. See U.S. Courts, Table C-2-U.S. District Courts-Civil Federal Judicial Caseload
Statistics (Mar. 31, 2020) available at https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/
c-2/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2020/03/31
(reporting
over
15,000
employment discrimination cases filed in 2019, accounting for more than 10% of all
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such as Black Lives Matter and #MeToo make clear that workplace
discrimination and harassment remain distressingly common. As a
lived experience, individuals often face discrimination on the basis of
multiple facets of identity, frequently compounding disadvantage for
the most vulnerable.7
But when employees who have been treated unfairly at work turn
to the legal system for relief, courts rarely assess whether their claims
meet the statutory standard. Instead, they typically funnel the
evidence through a convoluted body of judge-made law known as
McDonnell Douglas8 burden-shifting.9 Earlier commentators have
observed that the McDonnell Douglas test lacks a basis in the operative
language of the statutes.10 This Article shows the disconnect is more
fundamental, and more harmful, than previously recognized.
McDonnell Douglas is not only unanchored to the statutory language;
it is deeply in tension with it. McDonnell Douglas effectively holds
plaintiffs to a heightened causation standard—sole causation—that
Congress unequivocally rejected.11 Other aspects of the test also
function as judicially-created hurdles that may be irrelevant to the
ultimate question a jury would decide.
This has long been a problem in employment discrimination
doctrine, but several recent Supreme Court cases analyzing the causal
language in employment discrimination statutes make the
discrepancies more evident. These cases clarify that the statutory
language requires, at most, that an employee prove that a protected
trait or activity made a difference in an employer’s action.12 Under this
standard, known as but-for causation, it is irrelevant whether other
factors also play a role. The Court’s decision in the landmark case of
Bostock v. Clayton County is particularly salient.13 In holding that
federal question non-prisoner cases).
7. See, e.g., Ayden I. Scheim & Greta R. Bauer, The Intersectional Discrimination
Index: Development and Validation of Measures of Self-Reported Enacted and
Anticipated Discrimination for Intercategorical Analysis, 226 SOC. SCI. & MED. 225 (2019)
(quantitatively measuring compound effects of multiple identities, including race, age,
gender identity, sexuality, and education).
8. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell
Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 743
(2006).
11. See infra Part I.B.
12. Liability under Title VII may also be established by proving a protected trait
was a “motivating factor” in the decision. See infra Parts I.C, I.D.
13. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity
is also discrimination on the basis of sex, the Court affirmed that butfor causation can be a “sweeping standard” and that there can be, and
often are, several distinct but-for causes of an action.14
McDonnell Douglas, by contrast, rests on the false assumption
that in cases based on circumstantial evidence, there will only be a
single cause of a challenged action: either discriminatory bias or a
legitimate justification.15 An employee trying to prove discrimination
is expected to show that an employer’s claimed rationale for the action
is “pretextual.”16 The difference between these standards is
considerable. Under but-for causation, an employee alleging
pregnancy discrimination simply needs to prove that if she had not
been pregnant, she would not have been fired. If she can meet this
standard, it is not supposed to matter whether legitimate factors also
contributed to the decision. In practice, however, courts will typically
assess the claim under McDonnell Douglas, and the employee will
often lose if she cannot prove that the employer’s claimed rationale
was false.
The first step of McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting is similarly
flawed. Plaintiffs are required to establish what is known as the prima
facie case, which is commonly phrased as requiring that the plaintiff
be a member of a “protected class,” “qualified,” that she suffered an
“adverse action,” and that a “similarly-situated employee outside her
protected class” was treated differently, or, in some circuits, simply
that there are “circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination.”17 Although countless judicial decisions and reams of
academic commentary dissect the meaning of these elements, their
connection to the statutory language is tenuous at best.18 Moreover,
the McDonnell Douglas test functionally discounts the significance of
statements of discriminatory bias by relevant decision makers.19
It is easy to get lost in the technical details of the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting regime—there is a reason the various tests it
has spawned have been described as a “rat’s nest”20—but the practical
14. Id. at 1739–40. This clarification is important because imprecise language in
some earlier employment discrimination decisions had fueled the misconception that
but-for cause is functionally akin to sole cause. See infra Parts I.D.1, III.A.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II.D.
20. See Ortiz v. Werner Enters., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 766 (7th Cir. 2016).
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effects are very real. Workplace discrimination remains acutely
apparent, but plaintiffs lose on summary judgment in employment
cases at a higher rate than typical in other civil litigation.21 Often this
is because they cannot satisfy the McDonnell Douglas test, even when
there is ample evidence suggesting unlawful discrimination.22
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s causation decisions, there has
been a flourishing of academic scholarship exploring the promises and
limits of but-for causation.23 And lower court judges24 as well as
academic commentators25 have long argued McDonnell Douglas is
confusing, unnecessary, and inefficient. But the existing literature
does not engage substantively with the tensions between these two
bodies of doctrine.26 This Article builds on earlier critiques to make
important contributions to both doctrine and theory.
21. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean Miletich & David Rindskopf, A
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, J. EMP.
LEGAL STUD. 861, 887 (2007). My research did not identify a comparably rigorous
empirical study based on more recent data, but it is fair to say that summary judgment
remains extremely prevalent in employment discrimination cases. Cf. Nancy Gertner,
Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. FORUM 109 (2012) (article written by a longstanding federal
judge suggesting these statistics conformed with her experience in seventeen years on
the federal bench and identifying “losers’ rules” that help explain the skew).
22. See Katie Eyer, The Return of the Technical McDonnell Douglas Paradigm, 94
WASH. L. REV. 967, 977 n.55 (2019) (reporting that 88% of all appellate decisions
invoking McDonnell Douglas over a three-month period resulted in a total loss for
plaintiffs).
23. See, e.g., Hillel J. Bavli, Counterfactual Causation, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 879 (2019);
Jessica Clarke, Formal Causation (Feb. 13, 2021) (unpublished paper) (on file with
author); Katie Eyer, The But-For Theory of Anti-Discrimination Law, 107 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3801699 [https://perma.cc/
R5XH-68N8]; James A. MacLeod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental Statutory
Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957 (2019); Andrew Verstein, The Failure of Mixed-Motive
Jurisprudence, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 725 (2019) [hereinafter Verstein, Failure]; Andrew
Verstein, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127 YALE L.J. 1106 (2018) [hereinafter
Verstein, Jurisprudence].
24. See infra Part III.C.
25. See, e.g., SANDRA F. SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (2020) (providing meticulous explanation of the
doctrine and highlighting areas of inconsistency and confusion); id. at 321–22
(collecting critiques); Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting
Approach in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 (1995); Eyer,
supra note 22; Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks,
93 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1995) (arguing that the McDonnell Douglas proof structure
ought to be abandoned).
26. As this Article was being finalized for publication, I located a relatively short
essay that identifies the same disconnect and likewise contends McDonnell Douglas
should be abandoned or substantially revised. See Noelle N. Wyman, Because of
Bostock, 119 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 61 (2021).
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First, it lays bare the fundamental disconnect between the
statutes’ causal language—as explained in Bostock and other Supreme
Court decisions—and McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting. As Justice
Gorsuch’s majority opinion in Bostock emphasized, “You can call the
statute’s but-for causation test what you will—expansive, legalistic,
the dissents even dismiss it as wooden or literal. But it is the law.”27
Where there is a discrepancy between statutory language and a judgemade standard ostensibly aiding in the implementation of that statute,
it is clear Congress’s directive should control.
Second, the Article provides a straightforward and practical
solution: When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, courts
should assess the evidence based on the operative language in the
statute. Existing Supreme Court precedent offers lower courts
sufficient discretion to employ this approach. The Seventh Circuit has
taken an important step in this direction by authorizing the use of a
text-based standard.28 However, because the circuit did not
simultaneously disclaim McDonnell Douglas, courts are currently
operating under a confusing hybrid. The D.C. Circuit has likewise
indicated that the prima facie case is usually unnecessary, but other
circuits have declined to follow this approach.29 These examples
suggest both the possibilities and limitations of what I call “middledown” reform. Circuit courts can modify their own practice and
instruct district courts to do so, but they are themselves unsure how
much flexibility the doctrine affords.
To effectively address this problem, the Supreme Court will need
to give explicit directions to lower courts. The Court should either
substantially modify the burden-shifting process to comply with the
statutory language, or it should recognize the inherent tension and
simply instruct lower courts to no longer employ the burden-shifting
process.30 It should also clearly and completely reject the putative
distinction between so-called “single-motive” cases and so-called
“mixed-motive” cases and the erroneous, but oft-stated, assumption
that “mixed-motive” claims are not cognizable under a but-for causal
standard.
Finally, this Article contributes to a nascent but growing
literature that highlights the progressive possibilities of textualism.31
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1745 (2020).
See infra text accompanying notes 340–350.
See infra text accompanying notes 215–219.
See infra Part III.D.
See, e.g., Katie Eyer, Symposium: Progressive Textualism and LGBTQ Rights,
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Textualism has long been associated with right-leaning judges;
however, there is nothing inherently conservative about prioritizing
fidelity to statutory language. Bostock stands as a prime example of
this principle, but it is not an anomaly; there are other prominent
employment discrimination cases in which conservative Justices,
employing textualist tools, have interpreted statutes in ways that are
protective of employees.32 While academic and popular
commentators often describe such decisions as surprising,33 they
should not be. A fair reading of a progressive statute will often—and
should often—advance progressive objectives.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I discusses the relevant
statutory language and the key Supreme Court decisions interpreting
the causation standard in that statutory language. Part II explains
McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, highlighting disconnects between
the burden-shifting test and the statutes. Part III provides historical
context to expose the false dichotomies that underlie McDonnell
Douglas, and it discusses reforms that have been implemented by
some circuits to address these issues. It argues the Court should either
substantially clarify McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting to address
these tensions, or simply instruct lower courts to no longer employ
the doctrine. Part IV shows how a simpler standard based on the
statute’s operative language would better assess discriminatory
treatment and more fully realize Congress’s promise of equality.
SCOTUSBLOG (June 16, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/06/symposium
-progressive-textualism-and-lgbtq-rights [https://perma.cc/RQQ2-8MKF]; Katie R.
Eyer, Statutory Originalism and LGBT Rights, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 63, 85 (2019);
Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265 (2020); Kathryn E. Kovacs,
Progressive Textualism in Administrative Law, 118 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 134 (2019).
32. See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (majority
opinion by Justice Breyer on behalf of eight Justices and concurrence by Justice Alito
concluding non-employment related actions can constitute unlawful retaliation);
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (unanimous opinion by Justice
Thomas concluding “motivating factor” claims can be based on circumstantial as well
as direct evidence); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs. Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)
(unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia concluding same-sex sexual harassment
actionable). To be sure, there are also textualist decisions that are somewhat less
plaintiff friendly, such as the causation decisions discussed infra Part I.C. However, the
relevant language—”because of”—was ambiguous in those cases. Moreover, but-for
cause, properly interpreted, is a relatively capacious standard. See infra Part I.D.1.
33. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Neil Gorsuch? The Surprise Behind the Supreme Court’s
Surprising LGBTQ Decision, WASH. POST (June 16, 2020), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/neil-gorsuch-gay-transgender-rights
-supreme-court/2020/06/16/112f903c-afe3-11ea-8f56-63f38c990077_story.html
[https://perma.cc/MZD7-JTGX].
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I. CAUSATION
Employment discrimination laws prohibit employers from taking
adverse actions against employees because of their race, sex, or other
protected traits.34 Generally, the key factual dispute in a case will be
whether a plaintiff can prove this causal connection. But before a
judge or jury can answer that factual question, there is a separate legal
question of how close the nexus needs to be. The causal standard is
particularly likely to be contested when the evidence suggests the
relevant action was based on a combination of lawful and unlawful
considerations.
For example, imagine a pregnant employee is fired shortly after
she makes a significant mistake at work. Her boss claims he was
simply responding to poor performance, but the evidence also
suggests he was unhappy about her pregnancy and may not have
believed she would come back from maternity leave. If the employee
wants to challenge the termination as illegal sex discrimination, does
she need to prove that the mistake was entirely irrelevant, and she
was fired solely because of her pregnancy? That the mistake may have
played a role in the decision to fire her, but if she hadn’t been
pregnant, she wouldn’t have been fired? That the mistake may have
been a primary cause, but her pregnancy was also at least a substantial
factor? Or simply that the pregnancy played some role in the decision?
This range of potential causal standards—sole cause, but-for
cause, substantial factor, or contributing factor—arises in
constitutional, statutory, and common law claims ranging from tax
law to torts.35 When faced with the question in a statutory claim,
courts are of course bound by the operative language in the law. This
Part introduces the relevant statutory standards that apply in
employment discrimination statutes and then judicial interpretations
of that language.
A. STATUTORY STANDARD
The scope of unlawful discrimination is—or, more accurately,
should be—defined by statutory law. At common law, employers enjoy
34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, and national origin).
35. See Macleod, supra note 23, at 974–77 (identifying these four distinct causal
standards as arising in tort and criminal law, as well as antidiscrimination statutes);
see also Verstein, Jurisprudence, supra note 23, at 1134–43 (articulating and
graphically illustrating a range of standards expressed in law as including sole, but-for,
primary, and any motive).
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wide discretion to make personnel decisions. Under the “at will” rule,
an employee can generally be fired or refused employment for any
reason or no reason, as long as it is not for a reason that has been
specifically prohibited.36 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
subsequent civil rights statutes, change this baseline by mandating
that certain personal traits may not be used by employers to deny
employment opportunities.
Most individuals bringing a case under Title VII allege a violation
of section 703(a)(1) of the statute, which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.37

The statutory language thus requires a plaintiff to prove that an
employer engaged in a requisite adverse action (i.e., “refusal to hire,”
“discharge,” or other discrimination in the “compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment”) “because of” an individual’s
protected trait (e.g., race, color, religion, etc.). Section 703(a)(2)
proscribes additional unlawful actions that deprive or would tend to
deprive an individual of opportunities “because of” a protected trait.38
A separate section of the statute, section 704(a), prohibits employers
from discriminating against an employee “because” he filed a charge
alleging discrimination, participated in an investigation or hearing, or
opposed unlawful practices under the law.39 These claims are
generally known as retaliation claims.
Title VII was the model for many other federal employment
discrimination statutes. For example, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits discrimination by private
employers “because of” age,40 and the Americans with Disabilities Act
prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability” (while also
36. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment AtWill, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (2010). There are a few common law exceptions to the rule,
such as terminations in violation of public policy. Id. at 10.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (providing that employers cannot “limit, segregate,
or classify [their] employees” in a way that deprives or would tend to deprive an
individual of opportunities or otherwise adversely affect an employee because of
protected traits). For a persuasive argument that this clause prohibits a much broader
range of employer actions than is typically assumed, see Sandra F. Sperino, Justice
Kennedy’s Big New Idea, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1789 (2016).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
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providing a more extensive definition of what constitutes
discrimination).41 Many state employment discrimination statutes
include similar language,42 as do state and federal statutes addressing
discrimination in other contexts, such as housing and education.43
The statutory language—”because of”—does not clearly resolve
what causal standard applies when there are multiple motivations for
a given action. In ordinary speech, those words can encompass, at
least, “but-for” causation and a “substantial” or “contributing factor”
standard.44 As in any instance where statutory language is ambiguous,
courts interpret the relevant language as necessary to decide specific
cases, using a range of tools of statutory interpretation. Once the
Supreme Court issues a definitive interpretation, that interpretation
binds lower courts. However, Congress has ultimate authority in that
it may amend the statute to supersede a judicial interpretation with
which it disagrees.45 This interplay has been significant in the
development of causation standards under antidiscrimination laws.
B. (NOT) SOLE CAUSATION
The next Section discusses a several decades-long, and still
ongoing, dialogue between the Supreme Court and Congress as to
whether Title VII and other anti-discrimination statutes adopt a butfor standard or a motivating factor standard. It is abundantly clear,
however, that these statutes do not adopt a sole-cause standard.
The Supreme Court has consistently held that Title VII does not
require a plaintiff to prove a protected trait was the only cause of an
adverse employment action. It first disavowed a sole-causation
standard almost fifty years ago,46 and it reaffirmed this conclusion in

41. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
42. See generally Kevin J. Koai, Note, Judicial Federalism and Causation in State
Employment Discrimination Statutes, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 763 (2019) (discussing state
employment laws with language similar to Title VII).
43. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination in housing); 20 U.S.C. §
1681 (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded education
programs).
44. See, e.g., Macleod, supra note 23, at 998–1002.
45. See generally Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The
Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859 (2012) (describing the
role of overrides in causation cases).
46. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 n.10 (1976)
(holding that a plaintiff is not required to “show that he would have in any event been
rejected or discharged solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged
deficiencies”).
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Bostock.47 The Court’s interpretation reflects the ordinary meaning of
the relevant language; research shows that most people do not
interpret the phrase “because of” to mean a sole causation standard.48
The Court has also bolstered this interpretation by referencing
Congress’s explicit rejection of a proposed amendment that would
have added “solely” before the words “because of,”49 and
distinguishing Title VII’s language from other statutes that do
explicitly adopt a sole-causation standard.50
Congress’s debate regarding the proposed amendment highlights
the problems with a sole cause standard. Notably, the amendment was
authored by Senator John McClellan, a Southerner who was a leading
opponent of the Civil Rights Act generally.51 Senator Clifford Case, a
floor manager spearheading support for the bill, argued vehemently
against the change:
[T]his amendment . . . would render title VII totally nugatory. If anyone has
ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a different kind
of animal from any I know of . . . . [T]his amendment would place on persons
attempting to prove a violation of this section, no matter how clear the
violation was, an obstacle so great as to make the title completely
worthless.52

After further substantive debate on the merits of the proposal, the
amendment was defeated on the floor of the Senate; a comparable
amendment in the House was also defeated.53
47. See Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1744 (2020) (asserting that the
plaintiff’s “sex need not be the sole or primary cause of the employer’s adverse
action”); see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (plurality)
(“[W]e know the words ‘because of’ do not mean ‘solely because of’ . . . .”); see also id. at
284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“No one contends, however, that sex must be the sole
cause of a decision before there is a Title VII violation.”).
48. Macleod, supra note 23, at 998–1002.
49. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7 (plurality) (citing the failed
amendment).
50. See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (contrasting Title VII’s language with 11 U.S.C.
§ 525, which prohibits employment discrimination against an individual “solely
because” the individual has been a debtor in bankruptcy law, and 16 U.S.C. § 511, which
prohibits cancelation of homestead entries “solely because” of the erroneous
allowance of such entries).
51. See, e.g., M’Clellan, Attacking Rights Bill, Quotes Johnson Speech of ‘49, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 15, 1964), https://www.nytimes.com/1964/04/15/mclellan-attacking
-rights-bill-quotes-johnson-speech-of-49.html
[https://perma.cc/V3UK-487D]
(describing Senator McClellan’s opposition).
52. 110 CONG. REC. 13,837–38 (1964).
53. Id. at 2728, 13,838. For a more detailed discussion of this legislative history,
see Mark S. Brodin, The Standard in Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 292 (1982).
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Lower courts likewise consistently opine that antidiscrimination
statutes that use the same or similar causal language to Title VII—that
is, that prohibit adverse actions “because of” or “on the basis of”
protected traits or activities—also do not require a plaintiff to prove
sole causation.54 To be sure, there are a few antidiscrimination
statutes that explicitly adopt a sole cause standard,55 but the inclusion
of the word in some statutes generally strengthens the argument that
the requirement should not be read into statutes that lack the
language.
In other words, to satisfy the relevant statutory standards in
virtually all employment discrimination cases, a plaintiff should not
need to show that a protected trait or protected activity is the only
cause of a challenged decision. This statement, however, comes with
two major caveats. First, as developed in Parts II and III, common
articulations of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process
functionally adopt a sole causation standard. Second, and relatedly,
courts often suggest (incorrectly) there can be only one but-for cause
of a decision.56
Thus, in practice, plaintiffs are being held to a standard that both
Congress and the Court have unequivocally and repeatedly rejected. It
is precisely this tension with the statutory language that highlights the
need for the Court to clarify, or simply overrule, McDonnell Douglas
and to reaffirm the important differences between but-for cause and
sole cause.
C. MOTIVATING FACTOR OR BUT-FOR CAUSATION?
The harder question, as a matter of statutory interpretation, has
been whether a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination must
prove simply that a protected trait or activity was a factor in the
54. See, e.g., Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 315–16 (6th
Cir. 2012) (holding that the ADA does not require a plaintiff to prove sole causation);
Jones v. Oklahoma City Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding that
the ADEA does not require a plaintiff to prove sole causation); Papelino v. Albany
College of Pharmacy of Union Univ., 633 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that Title
IX does not require a plaintiff to prove sole causation).
55. The prime example is the Rehabilitation Act, a predecessor to the Americans
with Disabilities Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (prohibiting discrimination “solely by
reason . . . of a disability”). Even here, it is not clear whether this standard is still
applicable to employment discrimination claims under the Rehabilitation Act, as a
separate provision of the Rehabilitation Act incorporates the ADA’s causation
standard. See Natofsky v. City of New York, 921 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2019) (discussing this
issue).
56. See infra Parts I.D.1, III.B.
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challenged action, or whether a plaintiff must prove that if the
employer had not considered the protected trait or activity, the
outcome would have been different (i.e., but-for causation).
The Court’s first extended discussion of this question came in the
1989 case Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.57 The case was brought by Ann
Hopkins, who challenged Price Waterhouse’s refusal to make her a
partner.58 The evidence considered by the trial court established that
Hopkins did very good work, but that she was often abrasive in her
personal interactions.59 Several partners also made clear they deemed
her to be insufficiently feminine.60 Accordingly, the trial court
concluded that, as a factual matter, she was denied partnership in part
based on legitimate, non-discriminatory concerns about her
interpersonal skills, and in part based on her failure to conform to sexbased stereotypes about the proper behavior of women.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split
regarding the legal standard that applied when the evidence
established multiple reasons for an employer’s action, some of which
were permissible and some of which were not.62 Price Waterhouse
failed to fully resolve this confusion, as no single opinion garnered five
votes. A plurality opinion, authored by Justice Brennan on behalf of
four Justices, interpreted “because of” to mean that showing that
gender was a factor in a decision was enough to create liability under
the statute, unless the employer could prove—as an affirmative
defense—that it would have made the “same decision even if it had
not allowed gender [or another protected trait] to play . . . a role.”63
Concurrences by Justice White and Justice O’Connor suggested a
plaintiff would need to prove the protected trait was a “substantial”
factor, and Justice O’Connor interpreted the statute to require a
plaintiff to provide “direct evidence” that a protected trait played a
role in the decision before shifting the burden to the defendant to

57. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
58. Id. at 231–32.
59. Id. at 234–35.
60. Id. at 235–36.
61. Id. at 236–37.
62. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 470–71 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(discussing circuit split).
63. Id. at 244–45. The plurality also stated that “because of” did not mean but-for
causation, but later suggested that it understood that the defense was substantively
equivalent to but-for causation, albeit with the burden on the defendant to prove its
absence. Id. at 240, 249.
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justify its actions.64 Justice Kennedy, writing for three Justices in
dissent, did not believe that it was appropriate to shift the burden to
the defendant at any point.65 Rather, under the interpretation he
proposed, a plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that but-for the
employer’s consideration of a protected trait, the outcome would have
been different.66
In the 1991 Civil Rights Act, Congress responded to Price
Waterhouse, partially codifying and partially overriding the standard
announced by the plurality opinion. The Act added a new subsection
that explicitly stated that liability could be established if a plaintiff
demonstrated a protected trait was a “motivating factor” in a relevant
adverse action.67 It also provided that if liability was established
under this subsection, a defendant could limit remedies to injunctive
and declaratory relief, plus attorney’s fees, by proving it would have
made the same decision without considering the prohibited factor.68
Prior to the 1991 Act, many lower courts had interpreted Title VII’s
original language to authorize a comparable limitation on remedies.69
This is not surprising, as it merely makes explicit the result that basic
remedial principles would often yield. That is, it recognizes that it is
improper to allow discriminatory bias to infect an employment
decision, but it avoids putting the plaintiff in a better position than she
would have been absent the discrimination.
As I have discussed in detail elsewhere, Congressional overrides,
such as this one, can give rise to difficult questions of statutory
interpretation.70 Both federal and state courts have grappled with
how Congress’s response to Price Waterhouse should affect the
interpretation of other statutes modeled on Title VII.71
The Supreme Court first addressed the question in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, which concerned the standard of causation under
the ADEA.72 In Gross, the majority opinion interpreted the ADEA’s
prohibition on adverse actions “because of” age to require a plaintiff
to prove age was “the” but-for cause of the employer’s action.73 It
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring); id. at 275 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Id.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
See Widiss, supra note 45, at 903 (collecting cases).
See Widiss, supra note 45, at 866–80.
See Widiss, supra note 45, at 884–88.
557 U.S. 167 (2009).
Id. at 177. The Court’s use of a definite article—“the”—rather than an
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based this interpretation on dictionary definitions of “because” and
judicial interpretations in other contexts,74 while holding Price
Waterhouse and Congress’s response in the 1991 Act inapplicable on
the ground that Congress did not make comparable changes to the
language to the ADEA.75 A few years later, the Court reasoned that the
retaliation provisions of Title VII likewise require a showing of but-for
causation,76 and, just this past year, that section 1981 does as well.77
By contrast, the Court held that the federal sector provisions of the
ADEA—which require personnel decisions be made “free from” any
consideration of age—simply require a plaintiff to prove that age
played a “part” in the decision, but a plaintiff can only recover full
remedies if she proves age was a but-for cause of the differential
treatment.78
Lower courts have followed the Court’s reasoning in Gross when
interpreting other statutes, like the ADA, that prohibit discrimination
“because of” or “on the basis of” traits or actions.79 In short, based on
this series of cases, it is increasingly clear that most—but not all80—
federal employment discrimination statutes other than Title VII will
be interpreted to require a plaintiff to prove but-for causation. The
causal standard under state anti-discrimination statutes is likely to be
more mixed because state courts can choose to interpret state statutes
differently from their federal analogs.81
In previous work, I have been critical of the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Gross and the cases that followed Gross.82 But while
reasonable minds can disagree as to the proper inferences to draw
indefinite article—“a”—has contributed to lower courts’ improper conflation of butfor cause and sole cause. See infra text accompanying notes 116–18.
74. See 557 U.S. at 177.
75. Id. at 174–75.
76. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013).
77. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1017–
18 (2020).
78. Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1174 (2020).
79. See, e.g., Murray v. Mayo Clinic, 934 F.3d 1101, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding
that the ADA requires but-for causation); Gentry v. E. W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816
F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that the ADA requires but-for causation).
80. Even after Gross and Nassar, at least some courts have deferred to regulations
that apply a motivating factor standard to Family and Medical Leave Act retaliation
claims. See, e.g., Woods v. Start Treatment and Recovery Ctrs., Inc., 864 F.3d 158, 169
(2d Cir. 2017). There are also a few statutes that explicitly adopt a motivating factor
standard. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (prohibiting adverse employment actions if an
employee’s military service was a “motivating factor” in the action).
81. See generally Koai, supra note 42 (surveying state court decisions on point).
82. See Widiss, supra note 45, at 926–41.
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from Congress’s response to Price Waterhouse, it is clear that
throughout these cases, the Court is engaged in a process of statutory
interpretation. That is, the Court is interpreting statutory language
that is ambiguous, and it is using standard tools of statutory
interpretation to do so.83 This includes considering the ordinary
meaning of the relevant words,84 the verb tense of the operative
language in which the phrase appears,85 legislative history,86 the way
in which similar causation questions had been resolved under other
statutes and in constitutional and common law,87 relevant differences
among otherwise similar statutes,88 and statutory purpose89 to
resolve the question. As Part III shows, McDonnell Douglas is quite
different, as it has virtually no statutory basis at all.
D. A DISTINCTION WITHOUT MUCH DIFFERENCE
During the decades-long fight over causation standards, many
progressive advocates have vigorously argued that a “motivating
factor” standard is essential to realize the transformative promise of
antidiscrimination statutes.90 In so doing, they have sometimes
suggested that “but for” causation is extremely difficult to satisfy, or
even that it is equivalent to a “sole cause” standard.91 Courts
sometimes make the same mistake.92 Likewise, courts sometimes
incorrectly suggest that the kind of evidence put forward in a case—
direct or circumstantial—has relevance for determining the relevant
causal standard. These premises are erroneous. In both theory and
practice, but-for causation and motivating factor causation are quite
83. See, e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES,
TOOLS, AND TRENDS (Apr. 5, 2018) (cataloging common tools of statutory
interpretation).
84. See, e.g., Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1173–74 (2020); Gross v. FBL Fin.
Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 240
(1989).
85. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–41.
86. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 174–75; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241 n.7, 243–45.
87. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 348–49 (2013); Gross,
557 U.S. at 176; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258–60 (White, J., concurring); Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262–66 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
88. See Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1175–76; Nassar, 570 U.S. at 35–52; Gross, 557 U.S. at
176–77.
89. See Babb, 140 S. Ct. at 1177; Nassar, 570 U.S. at 358–60; Price Waterhouse, 490
U.S. at 239; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262–65 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
90. See Eyer, supra note 23 (collecting examples).
91. See Eyer, supra note 23, at 53.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 116–18.
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similar, particularly since full remedies are only available if but-for
cause is shown. In short, as Professor Charles Sullivan has aptly
observed in a recent article, “one wonders what all the fuss is about.”93
1. Multiple Factors
In Bostock, the employers claimed that their actions were based
on the plaintiffs’ sexual orientation or gender identity, rather than the
plaintiffs’ sex.94 In addressing and rejecting this argument, the Court
provided important clarification about the meaning and operation of
but-for causation in employment discrimination doctrine generally. It
explained that but-for causation simply requires a plaintiff to convince
a fact finder that it is more likely than not that if the plaintiff’s sex, race,
or other relevant protected trait had been different, or she had not
engaged in protected conduct, the challenged action would not have
occurred.95
As the Bostock Court emphasized, but-for causation can “be a
sweeping standard,” and “[o]ften, events have multiple but-for
causes.”96 It illustrated this point by describing a car accident that
occurred “both because the defendant ran a red light and because the
plaintiff failed to signal his turn at the intersection,” and concluded
that each factor could be a but-for cause.97 Accordingly, under a butfor causation standard, a “defendant cannot avoid liability just by
citing some other factor that contributed to its challenged decision.”98
Moreover, the Bostock Court explained that the proscribed trait does
not need to be the “primary cause” of the employer’s adverse action;
so long as the evidence shows that the trait made a difference, the
standard is satisfied, “even if ‘some other, nonprotected trait . . . was
the more important factor’ in the decision.”99
This is not a new or novel interpretation of Title VII. To the
contrary, the Bostock Court supported its discussion of but-for
causation by referencing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., a 1971
decision that was one of the very first Title VII cases decided by the
Supreme Court.100 That case was brought by a woman named Ida
93. See Charles A. Sullivan, Making Too Much of Too Little? Why “Motivating
Factor” Liability Did Not Revolutionize Title VII, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 359 (2019).
94. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
95. Id. at 1739.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1744.
100. Id. at 1743–44 (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)
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Phillips.101 When she applied for a job, she was told the company
would not hire women with young children; it did, however, routinely
employ men with young children.102 The company’s refusal to hire
Phillips was clearly based on two distinct factors: her sex, and the fact
that she had young children.103 If either factor had been different, the
outcome would have been different. In other words, each was a butfor cause of the decision. The circuit court had held the policy was
permissible,104 but in a brief, per curium decision, the Court
reversed,105 giving rise to a doctrine that came to be known as “sexplus.”106 So long as sex or another protected trait is one of the but-for
causes of an adverse employment action, a violation can be
established.107
Likewise, in Price Waterhouse, all of the Justices agreed that butfor causation—or, its corollary, the same decision defense—could be
used to resolve a case in which the evidence had established multiple
factors were at play.108 This was also true in an earlier case, McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., where the evidence suggested an
employee was discharged both because he had misappropriated cargo
and because of his race.109 In that case as well, the Court made clear
that as long as race was a cause of the adverse action, liability could
be established.110 In fact, as developed further below, since McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting requires the employer to provide a
justification for its actions, virtually every disparate treatment case

(per curiam)).
101. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543.
102. Id. at 542.
103. Id.
104. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated, 400
U.S. 542 (1971).
105. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
106. Kathryn Abrams, Title VII and the Complex Female Subject, 92 MICH. L. REV.
2479–95 (1994).
107. See, e.g., id. (discussing sex-plus doctrine). Prior to Bostock, these cases
typically were not framed in reference to “but-for” cause, but the doctrine clearly
establishes that where sex (or other protected trait) and some other factor are each a
cause of a challenged act, liability can be established. Cf. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming
Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1045–49 (10th Cir. 2020) (explaining how Bostock’s
explication of but-for cause supports the conclusion that sex-plus-age claims are
cognizable under Title VII).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 63–66.
109. 427 U.S. 273, 276 (1976).
110. Id. at 282–83; see also id. at n.10 (distinguishing but-for cause from sole
cause).
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includes at least some evidence suggesting both legitimate and nonlegitimate factors played a role in a challenged decision.111
The recognition that but-for causation can exist even when other
factors also contribute to an action, and that there can be multiple butfor causes of an action, is also well established in other areas of law.
The most recent Restatement of Torts, which the Court often deems
to be an important touchpoint for statutory discrimination law,
devotes an entire section to describing the possibility of multiple
sufficient causes for an action.112 Bostock also relied in part on an
interpretation of “because of” in a criminal statute, in which the Court
explained but-for cause can be established if the act “combines with
“some other factors” to produce the result.”113 In that case, the Court
opined that relevant conduct simply can be the “straw that broke the
camel’s back.”114 In fact, in a comprehensive review (and critique) of
mixed motive jurisprudence across constitutional, tort, and statutory
laws, Professor Andrew Verstein describes “but-for” causation as the
most common standard used to assess mixed motives.115
Thus, the difference between but-for causation and motivating
factor is not whether the evidence suggests multiple causes of an
adverse action; it is simply a question of how big a role the protected
trait or activity needs to play in the decision to establish liability.
Again, however, this basic principle comes with caveats. In Gross and
Nassar, the Court stated the plaintiff would need to prove the
protected trait or conduct was “the” but-for cause of the action.116 Its
111. See infra Part III.A.
112. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 27 (AM. L. INST. 2010). That said, tort
principles also suggest that alternatives to traditional but-for cause may be better
suited to apportioning responsibility when there are multiple but-for causes of a
decision. See id. cmt. a.
113. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1739 (2020) (citing Burrage v.
United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014)).
114. Burrage, 571 U.S. at 211.
115. Verstein, Failure, supra note 23 at 727.
116. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 352 (2013) (“Title VII
retaliation claims require [plaintiff prove that] the desire to retaliate was the but-for
cause of the challenged action.”); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009)
(“Plaintiff retains the burden . . . to establish that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the
challenged employment action.”). In Nassar, the dissenting Justices also seem to
incorrectly equate but-for cause with sole cause. See Nassar, 570 U.S. at 384 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (asserting that under the but-for standard adopted by the Court, a
plaintiff alleging retaliation could not establish liability if her firing was “prompted by
both legitimate and illegitimate factors”). By contrast, in Price Waterhouse, the
dissenting Justices arguing that the but-for standard should apply properly
characterized it as requiring that a plaintiff show a protected trait was “a cause of the
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use of a definite article, rather than an indefinite article, helped fuel
the misimpression that there can only be one but-for cause,117 and
that but-for cause is functionally equivalent to sole cause.118
Additionally, courts persist in erroneously suggesting that socalled “mixed motive” claims are not cognizable under a “but-for”
causation standard.119 Part III explains how the development of the
doctrine led to an association between the “motivating factor”
standard and the idea of “mixed motives,” but this presumed
dichotomy reflects a misunderstanding of relevant causal standards.
By stating explicitly that there can be multiple distinct but-for causes
of an action and providing examples of this principle, Bostock provides
much-needed clarification. However, Bostock does not announce a
“new” standard; rather, Bostock conforms to long-established
understandings of but-for causation and the differences between butfor causation and sole causation. Reaffirming these distinctions is
particularly essential given Congress’s clear repudiation of a sole
causation standard in Title VII.120
Finally, it is worth noting that the distinction between but-for
causation and motivating factor has not had much effect on Title VII
practice. In a recent article, Professor Charles Sullivan suggests this is
in part because courts have been confused by the motivating factor
standard, or simply unwilling to apply it literally.121 But he also notes
decision,” while distinguishing the standard from sole causation. Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 241, 284 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
117. See, e.g., Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 323–24 (6th Cir. 2021)
(relying on this language from Gross to suggest that under the ADEA, as compared to
Title VII, there could only be a single but-for cause); Mollet v. City of Greenfield, 926
F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he question is not . . . [whether plaintiff’s complaint]
was a but-for cause of the adverse action, rather whether the protected activity was
the but-for cause of the adverse action.”); see also D’Andra Millsap Shu, The Coming
Causation Revolution in Employment Discrimination Litigation, CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at *19–20 nn.123–24), https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=3915252 (critiquing the Court’s use of “the but-for cause” and collecting
additional lower court cases that conclude there can only be a single but-for cause);
Brian S. Clarke, The Gross Confusion Deep in the Heart of University of Texas Southwest
Medical Center v. Nassar, 4 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 75 (critiquing use of “the” in Gross as
inconsistent with Price Waterhouse’s conception of but-for cause).
118. See, e.g., Hendon v. Kamtex, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 3d 1325, 1330 (N.D. Ala. 2015)
(“‘But-for’ causation is sole causation.”); Gard v. U.S. Dep’t of Edu., 752 F. Supp. 2d 30,
35 (D.D.C. 2010) (“‘[S]olely by reason of’ is the equivalent to the ‘but-for’ analysis
adopted in Gross.”).
119. See infra text accompanying note 306; see also Shu, supra note 117, at *17–26
(discussing such misconceptions in detail).
120. See supra Part I.B.
121. See Sullivan, supra note 93, at 383–95.
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that many plaintiffs’ lawyers eschew the framework because they fear
it invites juries to split the difference between parties, providing a
technical win on liability while precluding most monetary damages.122
As this suggests, plaintiffs’ lawyers recognize that they can and do win
jury trials under a but-for standard.123 Indeed, Professor Katie Eyer
argues that the but-for standard may actually be helpful for plaintiffs,
as it focuses judicial attention on differential treatment, rather than
intent or motivation.124 Professor Jessica Clarke makes a similar point,
suggesting that it offers less space for conservative judges or juries to
excuse discriminatory motives as benign.125
2. Direct or Circumstantial Evidence
Before turning to McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, it is
important to highlight one other important point of commonality
between “motivating factor” and “but-for” causation standards: The
Supreme Court has interpreted the relevant statutory language to
allow either to be established with direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence, or a combination of the two.
This is not surprising, as it is the standard rule for all civil
litigation.126 However, recall that in Price Waterhouse, Justice
O’Connor interpreted Title VII to require “direct” evidence that a
prohibited trait played a role in a decision to shift the burden to the
defendant to justify its action.127 After Congress responded to Price
Waterhouse by adding the “motivating factor” subsection, lower
courts were split as to whether the “direct” evidence requirement
122. Sullivan, supra note 93, at 396–98; see also David Sherwyn, Steven A. Carvell
& Joseph Baumgarten, The Mixed Motive Instruction Employment Discrimination Cases:
What Employers Need to Know, 2007–08 UNIV. RISK MGMT. & INS. ASS’N 75–80 (providing
empirical support for this concern).
123. Most circuits apply but-for causation as their default jury instruction. See, e.g.,
COMM. ON PATTERN CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., FED. CIV. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR. § 3.01 (2017), http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/
pattern-jury-instructions/7th_cir_civil_instructions.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KV8G
-XN2Z]. While only a tiny sliver of all cases filed are resolved at a jury trial, plaintiffs
win about 40% of those that do go to trial. See Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim, Media
Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination
Litigation, 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 252 (2004). This study does not specify whether
a motivating factor instruction was given; however, these are so rare that it is
reasonable to assume that most were decided under a standard but-for charge.
124. See Eyer, supra note 23, at 19–21.
125. See Clarke, supra note 23, at 6.
126. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 99 (2003).
127. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
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applied to that provision.128 The Court addressed and resolved the
question in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.129 The unanimous decision,
authored by Justice Thomas, focused narrowly on the text of the
statute.130 Noting that the relevant provision simply required a
plaintiff “demonstrate” the employer considered a prohibited trait,
and contrasting it with provisions in the same title of the U.S. Code that
apply heightened proof structures, the Court concluded that either
circumstantial or direct evidence could be used to make the relevant
showing.131 The Court also supported this interpretation by citing an
earlier Title VII case, brought under section 703(a)(1), which had also
concluded that “as in any lawsuit, the plaintiff may prove his case by
‘direct or circumstantial evidence.’”132
Accordingly, the Court has definitively held that a plaintiff can use
both circumstantial and direct evidence to satisfy the requisite causal
standards set forth in section 703(a)(1) (prohibiting discrimination
“because of” of a protected trait) and section 703(m) (providing
liability can also be established by showing a protected trait was a
“motivating factor” in an adverse action). In other words, under both
of these provisions, courts should treat “circumstantial and direct
evidence alike.”133 However, as was true above in the discussion of the
Court’s clear rejection of a “sole” causation standard, and the
discussion of the meaning of but-for cause, this statement comes with
a caveat. As Parts II and III discuss, common articulations of the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process, and its relationship to socalled “mixed motive” cases, continue to suggest that there is a
relevant distinction between “direct” and “circumstantial” evidence.
This again highlights the need for the Court to clarify, or simply reject,
McDonnell Douglas.
II. MCDONNELL DOUGLAS BURDEN-SHIFTING
Part I discusses the Supreme Court’s repeated and detailed
consideration of the causal burden on a plaintiff under various
employment discrimination statutes. In practice, however, the
causation standard employed is less important than whether a
128. See Desert Palace, Inc., 539 U.S. at 95 (cataloguing circuit split).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 98 (emphasizing that the “starting point” for the analysis is the
“statutory text”).
131. Id. at 99–100.
132. Id. (quoting Postal Serv. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714 n.3 (1983)).
133. Id. at 100.
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plaintiff can successfully squeeze the evidence into an arcane and
complicated body of judge-made law known as McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting.
It is difficult to overstate the influence of McDonnell Douglas.
Professor Sandra Sperino accurately describes it as “the most
important case” in employment discrimination law, and she has
written an entire book on its application.134 A judge recently put it
more colorfully, noting that in the half century since the opinion was
issued, “[m]ore than 57,000 court opinions have cited it,” amounting
to a rate of “[m]ore than 3 cases a day (including weekends and
holidays!).”135 This Part explains the doctrine. The next Part shows
how it relates to the causation standard, arguing that it is difficult—if
not impossible—to reconcile them.
A. JUDICIALLY-CREATED STANDARD
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting is named in reference to the
case where it was first articulated.136 Percy Green, a black man and
civil rights activist, was a mechanic at McDonnell Douglas.137 In 1964,
he was laid off as part of a reduction in force.138 He protested this
decision, and other allegedly discriminatory policies, by disrupting
access to the plant.139 The company subsequently advertised for new
mechanics.140 Mr. Green applied, but the company refused to rehire
him.141 The company claimed its decision was based on his
participation in unlawful conduct connected with the protests; Mr.
Green alleged it was based on his race.142
Faced with what it characterized as “opposing factual
contentions,” and no direct evidence of discrimination,143 the Court
announced a three-step process that courts could use to resolve such
disputes under Title VII.144 First, the plaintiff must establish a “prima
facie case of racial discrimination.”145 In McDonnell Douglas, this was
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

SPERINO, supra note 25.
Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 351 (5th Cir. 2019) (Costa, J., concurring).
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Id. at 794.
Id.
Id. at 794–95.
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 801.
Id. at 802.
Id.
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articulated as requiring the plaintiff to prove he belonged to a “racial
minority,” was qualified and applied for an open job, was rejected, and
that the employer continued to seek applicants for the position.146
Upon this showing, the employer is required to articulate a legitimate
nondiscriminatory rationale for its action.147 The plaintiff then has an
opportunity to show that the employer’s claimed justification was “in
fact pretext.”148
This three-part structure became the default framework to
assess any case based on circumstantial evidence, at least at the
summary judgment phase. In McDonnell Douglas and later cases, the
Court has described the process as a mechanism for organizing the
evidence rather than a formal legal test.149 The Supreme Court has
repeatedly suggested that it is meant to be a flexible standard. In
McDonnell Douglas itself, the Court recognized that the prima facie
case would “not necessarily [be] applicable in every respect to
differing factual situations.”150 In later cases, it has affirmed that it
“was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic,”151 and that
the burden of establishing the prima facie case is “not onerous.”152
However, lower courts, bound to apply Supreme Court
precedent, often demonstrate a slavish adherence to the structure. It
has spawned fifty years of litigation and confusion, and significant
inter- and intra-circuit splits have developed on many of the factors.153
To resolve these questions, courts at all levels typically parse the
language of prior judicial decisions, including portions that are
arguably dicta, as if they were governing law. Shortly after joining the
Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, already a firmly committed textualist,
took issue with this practice.154 But, despite the ascendance of
textualist approaches to statutory interpretation in most areas of law,
and the recognition that McDonnell Douglas itself is unanchored to the
statute, the Supreme Court continues to treat McDonnell Douglas
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 804.
149. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
150. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
151. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
152. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
153. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
154. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (criticizing the
dissent’s argument as having support “only in the dicta of this Court’s opinions” and
then turning “begrudgingly” to “dissect the sentences of the United States Reports as
though they were United States Code”).
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burden-shifting as the default framework by which most individual
disparate treatment cases should be resolved.
Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc. is the most striking recent
example of the ongoing centrality of McDonnell Douglas.155 That case
concerned the denial of a pregnancy accommodation,156 and it turned
on the Court’s interpretation of an amendment to Title VII that added
a specific mandate that employers treat pregnant employees the same
as other employees with similar ability or inability to work.157 Lower
courts had struggled with how to adapt McDonnell Douglas to this
context; by rigidly applying the standard prima facie case, they clearly
imposed requirements in terms of comparators beyond what the law
itself required.158
When arguing the case at the Supreme Court, the Petitioner, as
well as the United States and the EEOC participating in the case as
amici, took the position that McDonnell Douglas was unnecessary and
unhelpful; they contended that the analysis should focus simply on the
statutory language.159 The Court, however, did not take this
approach.160 Instead, while it recognized that the standard
articulation of the test did not work in this context, it implied that
some version of McDonnell Douglas was required for disparate
treatment cases involving only circumstantial evidence.161 It then
announced a modified test that changes each step so as to be almost
unrecognizable and that blurs the putative distinction between
disparate impact and disparate treatment.162 My point here is not to
155. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
156. Id. at 1344.
157. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
158. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1348, 1355.
159. See id.; Petitioner’s Brief at 47, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct.
1338 (No. 12-1226); Brief for the United States as Amicus Cur. at *16–17, Young v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226).
160. See Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345.
161. See id. (“We have also made clear that a plaintiff can prove disparate
treatment either (1) by direct evidence that a workplace policy . . . expressly relies on
a protected characteristic, or (2) by using the burden-shifting framework set forth in
McDonnell Douglas.”).
162. At step one, the Court reformulates the prima facie case to focus specifically
on whether other employees denied accommodations were “similar in their ability or
inability to work”; at step two, the Court categorically prohibits certain nondiscriminatory rationales that are normally acceptable; and at step three, it states that
the “pretext” analysis should consider factors that are typically relevant to disparate
impact claims rather than disparate treatment claims. Id. at 1354; cf. id. at 1364 (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s approach as entirely ungrounded in the
relevant statutory text).

378

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[106:353

critique the end result.163 Rather, my point is simply that Young and
decisions like it perpetuate the idea that lower courts must continue
to use McDonnell Douglas, even when it adds little to, or actually
conflicts with, the analysis that the relevant statutory language
suggests.
McDonnell Douglas is used primarily to assess cases based on
circumstantial evidence at the summary judgment stage.164 This is
more central than it may seem. Only about six percent of employment
discrimination cases advance to a trial; the vast majority are resolved
at summary judgment, or settled in the shadow of summary
judgment.165 Likewise, as discussed more fully below, courts have
adopted very narrow conceptions of what constitutes “direct”
evidence of discrimination.166 In general, it must be a statement made
by the decisionmaker that explicitly links the adverse action to a
protected trait—something akin to “I am firing you because you are
pregnant.” Such statements are, unsurprisingly, rare. And while
plaintiffs asserting status-based claims under Title VII are entitled to
proceed under the motivating factor standard, most decline to do
so.167 Thus, most employment discrimination cases are funneled
through McDonnell Douglas.
Outside the summary judgment context, McDonnell Douglas is
generally not used, or at least it is not dispositive.168 The Supreme
Court has held that a complaint can survive a motion to dismiss even
if it does not plead facts supporting each element of the prima facie

163. If properly applied, the Young Court’s version of McDonnell Douglas would
often lead to the same result as the more straightforward textual approach advocated
by the Petitioner. See Deborah A. Widiss, The Interaction of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act After Young v. UPS, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1423, 1441–49 (2017). Lower courts, however, are struggling to apply the
new standard, importing rigid “comparator” requirements derived from other
applications of McDonnell Douglas that go beyond what the statute itself requires. See
Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian Thomas, Making Sure Pregnancy Works: Accommodation
Claims After Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 14 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 319, 339–42
(2020).
164. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 25, at 68.
165. See ELLEN BERREY, ROBERT L. NELSON & LAURA BETH NIELSEN, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 61
(2017) (showing that 76% of filed employment discrimination cases are resolved on
summary judgment, or settlement during the discovery or pre-trial phases, while just
6% go to trial, with the remainder being resolved on a motion to dismiss).
166. See infra Part II.D; see also SPERINO, supra note 25, at 69–74.
167. See sources cited supra note 122.
168. For an excellent discussion of these nuances, see SPERINO, supra note 25, at
293–97, 302–10.
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case or the burden-shifting process.169 And most circuits discourage
charging juries on the entire test, reasoning that it is too confusing and
that the burden-shifting process is irrelevant once all of the evidence
has been presented.170 That said, discrete elements of the doctrine—
e.g., that a jury may infer discrimination from a showing of pretext—
are often charged.171 Courts are inconsistent about whether the test
should be used in post-trial motions or appeals; again, however, even
if they do not use the full test, individual elements and subsidiary
doctrines often play a key role in the analysis.172
The applicability of the test to statutes other than Title VII is also
somewhat unclear. Lower courts and administrative agencies
routinely apply the test in discrimination cases of all kinds.173
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to formally
confirm that it governs other statutes; rather, it tends to indicate that
since the parties have not challenged its applicability, it will assume it
applies.174 This coyness is somewhat confusing. If, as the Court asserts,
McDonnell Douglas is simply a helpful mechanism for organizing
evidence and clarifying reasonable inferences that flow from such
evidence, it is hard to see why it wouldn’t be applicable in other
discrimination contexts. That said, since lower courts tend to treat the
process as both compulsory and rigid, transposing the test to other
statutes often causes confusion, because courts are unsure how to
modify the structure to make it “fit” distinct statutory contexts.
B. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE
The initial articulation of the prima facie case in McDonnell
Douglas was particularized to a race-based claim for failure to hire.175
Later cases have generalized the test, but without uniformity. It is now
typically phrased as requiring a plaintiff to prove she is a “member of
a protected class,” that she was “qualified” for the position or that she
met the employer’s “legitimate expectations,” that she suffered an
169. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
170. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 302–04.
171. Id. at 302.
172. See id. at 306–10.
173. See, e.g., id. at 251–65 (discussing its application in ADEA, ADA, and section
1981 cases); id. at 311–15 (discussing its application under state discrimination laws);
Eyer, supra note 22, at 975 n.42 (discussing application by administrative agencies in
other discrimination contexts).
174. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000);
O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 309 (1996).
175. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 794 (1973).
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“adverse action,” and either that she was treated differently than a
“similarly-situated” individual who was not in the protected class, or
(in some circuits) that she can identify evidence that supports “an
inference of discrimination.”176 A modified version applies in
retaliation cases,177 and it has been adapted further in its application
to other statutes.178
Scholars and courts have extensively critiqued the prima facie
case, and Professor Sandra Sperino’s treatise in particular offers
detailed and perceptive commentary on many of the tensions I
discuss. My objective in this Section is simply to highlight the
disconnect between the underlying statutory language and each of the
elements. In doing so, I use the word “element” consciously. The Court
has stated that the test does not identify formal legal elements.179
Lower courts, however, routinely dismiss cases that fail to satisfy one
or more of its requirements, suggesting they do function as
elements.180
The first element—membership in a “protected class”—suggests
a particular concern with groups who have been historically subject
to discrimination. The statute, by contrast, focuses on personal
traits—race, sex, etc.—that all individuals possess. More than forty
years ago, the Court interpreted the statutory language to hold a white
employee who asserted he was treated less well than similarlysituated Black employees had a viable claim.181 This would have been
an opportune point for the Court to have clearly rejected the
“protected class” language. It did not. Instead, there is now a subdoctrine of lower court decisions straining to apply the “protected
176. Compare, e.g., Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1221 (11th Cir.
2019) (en banc) (articulating fourth element as requiring a comparator and asserting
Supreme Court “has repeatedly (and consistently) included a comparator-evidence
assessment . . . as an element of a plaintiff’s prima facie case”), with Bucalo v. Shelter
Island Union Free Sch. Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2012) (articulating fourth
element as circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination). See also
SPERINO, supra note 25, at 102–50 (discussing circuit-based variation in all of the
elements in detail).
177. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 237–51 (collecting case law on the retaliation
prima facie case).
178. See id. at 251–65, 311–15 (discussing modifications under other statutes).
179. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
180. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 108–46 (providing examples of courts
dismissing cases that fail to satisfy the requirements); see also Suzanne B. Goldberg,
Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728 (2011) (discussing and critiquing
cases dismissed because plaintiff could not identify a comparator).
181. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 283 (1976).
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class” language to so-called “reverse discrimination” claims,182 as well
as to claims based on an individual’s “association” with someone of a
different race, religion, or other protected trait.183 There is also an
ongoing circuit split as to how the “protected class” element applies
when a plaintiff alleges the employer has misperceived her identity,
for example a Latino man alleging he is subject to discrimination
because his supervisor incorrectly thinks he is of Middle Eastern
origin.184
The second element—”qualified” for the relevant position—has
no anchoring in the primary operative clauses of Title VII. This
absence is particularly significant, given that a more specific provision
included in the statute permits use of professionally-developed ability
tests so long as they are not “designed, intended or used to
discriminate” because of the protected traits.185 The existence of
language specifically addressing how qualification tests may be used
suggests it is inappropriate to read a qualification requirement into
the general prohibition on discrimination.186 Nor is the meaning of
this judicially-created requirement clear. It has most salience in cases
challenging a failure to hire, where it is used to assess whether a
plaintiff meets objective requirements, such as licensure.187 By
contrast, in cases challenging a termination, demotion, or failure to
promote, the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale is
generally that an employee has engaged in workplace misconduct or
is less qualified than other employees or applicants.188 Employers
182. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 25, at 146–50, 230–34.
183. See id. at 104–06.
184. See id. at 106–08; see also Jessica A. Clarke, Protected Class Gatekeeping, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 101 (2017).
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h); see also id. § 2000e-2(l) (prohibiting adjusting scores
based on protected traits).
186. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 524 (1989) (“A
general statutory rule usually does not govern unless there is no more specific rule.”).
Furthermore, Congress has included more general qualification language in other
statutes that are generally similar. For example, the Americans with Disabilities Act
prohibits discrimination against “a qualified individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Title VII
simply prohibits discrimination against “any individual.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Courts
often interpret such differences to be significant. Cf. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
581–82 (1978) (discussing the significance of Congress’s incorporating and modifying
language from earlier statutes).
187. Cf. Narin v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 323, 332 (3d Cir. 2000)
(concluding that plaintiff failed to produce any evidence showing she had teaching
certifications in both mathematics and science).
188. See, e.g., Waters v. Logistics Mgmt. Inst., 716 F. App’x 194, 197 (4th Cir. 2018)
(recounting employer’s argument that it had failed to retain plaintiff in a restructuring
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sometimes point to such evidence to suggest that the employee cannot
meet the “qualification” prong.189 This requires courts to either
grapple prematurely with the ultimate question in the case, or to make
the standard almost meaningless by interpreting it to simply require
meeting the bare minimum of expectations for a position.
The third element—often phrased as being “subject to an adverse
action”—is the element that has the most grounding in the statute. To
proceed under section 703(a)(1), an employee must be able to show
that an employer has “fail[ed] or refuse[d] to hire or . . . discharge[d],
or otherwise discriminated against any individual with respect to the
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”190
703(a)(2) proscribes actions related to the classification of
employees191 and 704(a) proscribes discriminatory actions in
responses to complaints.192 These provisions are wordy, and “adverse
action” could be a helpful shorthand to reference the full range of
prohibited actions. However, in practice, courts often treat the phrase
as an independent element that is unanchored from the relevant
statutory language, meaning they rely on a common-law like body of
doctrine about what suffices, while ignoring the interpretation of
similar language in other statutes governing the workplace.193
Courts also frequently use “adverse action” as a generic term
when articulating the prima facie case for retaliation claims.194 The
statutory provision relating to retaliation, however, encompasses a
broader range of actions than those listed in section 703, as the
retaliation provision simply prohibits “discrimination” without the
reference to hiring, firing, or the privileges, terms, or conditions of
employment.195 Focusing on this statutory difference, the Court has
concluded that a retaliation claim may be brought to challenge any
action that would tend to deter a reasonable person in a similar
because plaintiff had not been performing his job well).
189. See id. (referencing alleged performance difficulties in managing employees
as failure to meet this prong).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
191. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
192. Id. § 2000e-3(a).
193. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 111–26 (collecting caselaw and suggesting it
could be appropriate for courts to consider how the statutory language has been
interpreted in other contexts).
194. See, e.g., A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir.
2013) (noting that the prima facie case in retaliation claim includes the defendants
“took adverse action” against plaintiffs); SPERINO, supra note 25, at 239–44 (discussing
confusion caused by use of the same phrase in both contexts).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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position from complaining about alleged discrimination, and that this
may encompass non-work-related actions.196 Harassment cases have
spawned yet another, confusingly similar judge-created term:
“tangible employment action,” which has relevance in assessing
vicarious liability.197 Refocusing attention on the relevant statutory
text in all of these contexts would alleviate significant confusion.
The fourth element—most frequently articulated as requiring
identification of “a similarly-situated comparator outside the
protected class who is treated differently”—includes multiple subelements, none of which is based in the statute, and the meaning of
which is often deeply contested. This requirement imports all of the
problems with the concept of “protected class” articulated above. It
then compounds those problems by requiring courts to determine
who is within or outside such class; this is particularly challenging if a
plaintiff brings an intersectional claim, alleging discrimination on the
basis of multiple traits, such as her race and her sex.198 It then requires
courts to parse—ostensibly as a precursor to the employer’s
articulation of a legitimate non-discriminatory rationale—whether an
employee is “similarly situated” to the proposed comparator, an
analysis that typically turns on the employer’s claimed rationale.199
And, most obviously, it categorically denies claims where an employee
cannot identify a sufficiently similar comparator, even if there may be
ample evidence suggesting discriminatory intent.200
Some circuits have taken steps to ameliorate these problems. For
example, circuit court decisions have specified that if a plaintiff can
provide specific other forms of circumstantial evidence—most
196. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–69 (2006).
197. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
198. Kimberlé Crenshaw first developed her theory of intersectionality in an
article arguing Black women should be considered a separate protected class under
Title VII. See Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Policies, 1 U. CHI. LEGIS. F. 139 (1989). Courts have signaled some openness this
approach. See Jeffries v. Harris Cnty. Cmty. Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir.
1980). But it remains somewhat unclear how relevant comparators “outside” the
protected class are identified.
199. See, e.g., Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918 F.3d 1213, 1224–29 (11th Cir.
2019) (en banc) (discussing range of standards used to determine sufficient
similarity).
200. See, e.g., id. at 1230–31 (affirming summary judgment on grounds plaintiff had
failed to identify comparators who were similar “in all material respects”). But see id.
at 1257–60 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in part) (cataloguing evidence suggesting
discrimination). See generally Goldberg, supra note 180 (discussing and critiquing the
comparator requirement).
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commonly, that a relevant decisionmaker relied on stereotypes
associated with a protected trait—a comparator is not required.201 Of
course, this distinction is also not in the statute, and it can lead to a
fight as to whether specific comments fit within this category.202 Nor
is a comparator typically required in harassment cases (which often
proceed on an entirely distinct track from McDonnell Douglas).203
While this solves the comparator problem, it promotes the
misconception that harassment claims are fundamentally different
from other disparate treatment claims, and it may mean that courts
refuse to consider how evidence suggesting an employee was subject
to severe or pervasive abuse may also suggest a subsequent adverse
action was based on discriminatory intent.204
The cleaner, better solution to the comparator problem is to
rephrase the fourth element as merely requiring “circumstances that
support an inference of discrimination.” Comparators are one way,
but not the only way, of satisfying this standard. Some circuits use this
formulation regularly,205 and the Supreme Court has at least implied
this is permissible.206 In retaliation cases, it is standard to articulate
the final element of the prima facie case as simply requiring evidence
of a “causal link” between an employee’s protected conduct and an
adverse employment action.207 These articulations mean the final
element of the prima facie case addresses the ultimate factual
question in the case—is the challenged action based on
discrimination? So long as a court is willing to consider the same
evidence at this stage and the “pretext” stage, this is merely inefficient
and repetitive. However, if a court is reluctant to do so, it may discount
201. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Wellpoint, Inc. 561 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2009).
202. See id. at 49 (reversing lower court decision that had held statement must
specify “sex” explicitly to qualify).
203. See, e.g., Stewart v. Rise, Inc., 791 F.3d 849, 859–60 (8th Cir. 2015)
(articulating different prima facie case for harassment that does not include a
comparator element).
204. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 281–85 (discussing the relationship between
McDonnell Douglas and harassment claims).
205. See, e.g., Mandel v. M&Q Packaging Corp. 706 F.3d 157, 169 (3d Cir. 2013);
Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 2012); Gorzynski v. JetBlue
Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 2010).
206. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510, 515 (2002) (referencing,
without qualification, this articulation of the fourth element of the test as used by the
lower court, while overruling the lower court’s holding that the complaint must allege
each element).
207. See, e.g., A.C. ex rel. J.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Edu., 711 F.3d 687, 697 (6th Cir.
2013).
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evidence that could be very relevant to establishing discrimination
because it was already “used” in the prima facie case.208
The deeper point is that the prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas is generally useless. The prima facie case was designed to
provide sufficient evidence of discrimination to justify requiring an
employer to articulate a legitimate non-discriminatory rationale for
its actions.209 This may have been a helpful tool when cases were
decided by judges after bench trials. But even in that context, the
Supreme Court quickly made clear that “[w]here the defendant has
done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had
properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did
so is no longer relevant.”210 Because the Supreme Court has also held
that pleadings in a case do not need to satisfy McDonnell Douglas,211
the first time the standard is dispositive is if a defendant moves for
summary judgment. By that point, the employer has virtually always
articulated a justification.212 Indeed, in most instances, the employer
provides a rationale for its actions even before the lawsuit is filed, in
the position statement it files with the EEOC.213 It then develops that
justification throughout the discovery process and defends and
supports its rationale in its summary judgment brief.214
The D.C. Circuit—but only the D.C. Circuit—has formally
recognized this reality. More than a decade ago, in a decision by thenJudge Kavanaugh, it castigated the prima facie case as “a largely
unnecessary sideshow” that “spawn[s] enormous confusion and

208. This same issue may arise when the fourth element specifies a comparator is
required. Cf. Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838 (7th Cir. 2009) (“The prima
facie case and pretext analyses often overlap.”).
209. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (“The
complainant . . . must carry the initial burden . . . of establishing a prima facie case
[before] [t]he burden . . . must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for [its actions].”).
210. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983).
211. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002); see also Woods v. City
of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017) (discussing how Swierkiewicz
interacts with Iqbal and Twombly but reaffirming that Swierkiewicz remains “binding
precedent”).
212. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 152 (labeling the defendant’s burden “not
onerous”).
213. See Effective Position Statements, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/effective-position-statements [https://perma.cc/
RYC2-QYT7].
214. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 157 (“[T]he defendant cannot meet its burden
merely through an answer to the complaint . . . .”).
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wast[es] litigant and judicial resources.”215 It explicitly directed that,
so long as a plaintiff had suffered an adverse action within the
meaning of the statutory language and the employer had asserted a
legitimate justification of the action, district courts “should not”
decide whether the prima facie case has been satisfied.216 Lower
courts listened; district courts within the D.C. circuit almost never
consider the prima facie case anymore.217 Individual judges in other
circuits have likewise called for abandoning the prima face case, and
it is relatively common for courts to “assume without deciding” it has
been satisfied.218 But in the many years since the D.C. Circuit made this
shift, no other circuit has adopted the practice as a formal rule; to the
contrary, several have considered and rejected the option.219
C. LEGITIMATE NON-DISCRIMINATORY RATIONALE / PRETEXT
The second and third stages of McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting—the employer’s burden to provide a legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale, and the plaintiff’s burden to prove the
rationale is pretextual—obviously interrelate. The formal burden on
the employer at Step 2 is quite slight. It simply must articulate, based
on admissible evidence, a rationale for its action.220 This is a burden
of production, not persuasion.221 This burden is not onerous, and
cases are virtually never resolved on an employer’s failure to satisfy
this requirement.222

215. See Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
216. See id.
217. See, e.g., Wang v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 206 F. Supp. 3d 46, 67
(D.D.C. 2016) (following Brady to hold the prima facie case is not required and thus
rejecting employer’s argument that comparators were required as incorrect as a
matter of law). Where appropriate, courts in the D.C. Circuit do still consider whether
plaintiffs can establish an “adverse action,” recognizing appropriately that that
element is required by the statutory language. See, e.g., Norris v. Wash. Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 342 F. Supp. 3d 97, 112–13 (D.D.C. 2018).
218. See, e.g., Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1225–26 (10th Cir.
2003) (Hartz, J., writing separately); Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment
Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 678–79 (2012)
(describing cases in which he assumed without deciding the prima facie case was
established to focus on the ultimate factual issue in the case).
219. See, e.g., Pepper v. Precision Valve Corp., 526 F. App’x 335, 336 n.* (4th Cir.
2013); Stallworth v. Singing River Health Sys., 469 F. App’x 369, 372 (5th Cir. 2012);
Hinds v. Sprint/United Mgmt., 523 F.3d 1187, 1202 n.12 (10th Cir. 2008).
220. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1981).
221. Id.
222. See SPERINO, supra note 25, at 151–52.
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Once the employer has articulated its justification, the burden
returns to the plaintiff to prove “pretext.”223 The most common
articulation of this final step comes from Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.224 In that case, the Court characterized
the plaintiff’s responsibility at this point as “demonstrat[ing] that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment
decision,” a burden that “merges with the ultimate burden of
persuading a court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination.”225 The intuition underlying this final step is
important. As the Court put it in a case decided a few years after
McDonnell Douglas, it is reasonable to assume that the employer acts
with “some reason” rather than entirely arbitrarily; accordingly, if the
evidence suggests that the employer’s claimed justification is not
credible, it will often suggest that the action was actually based on an
“impermissible consideration.”226 This is a more general inference,
not limited to employment discrimination. We often assume that
individuals lie to cover up something improper.
In Burdine, the Court suggested this step offered two, disjunctive
options; a plaintiff could prove discrimination “either directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”227 This gave rise to
fifteen years of litigation over the legal relevance of establishing
pretext without other evidence of discriminatory intent.228 (It also
suggests, I would argue unjustifiably, that these assessments are
entirely distinct, a point further developed in the following Section.)
The details of the debate are not important to the analysis that follows.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that evidence of pretext could be—
and often would be—sufficient to allow a fact finder to infer that the
challenged decision was based on discriminatory bias, even if there
was no other evidence of discriminatory intent.229 In other words, if
the evidence referenced in opposition to a defendant’s motion for
summary judgment could convince a reasonable fact finder that the

223. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 568, 577 (1978).
227. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
228. See generally Eyer, supra note 22 (providing an excellent discussion of
litigation on this point).
229. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147–49 (2000).
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employer’s justification was pretextual, summary judgment should
typically be denied.
The more pertinent point is that throughout these cases, the
Court consistently suggests that to show “pretext,” a plaintiff must
prove the employer’s claimed justification is fabricated or untrue. In
Burdine, the Court characterizes the step as allowing the plaintiff “the
opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true
reason,” and that it is “unworthy of credence.”230 In Hicks, the second
of these cases, the majority characterizes the stage as requiring the
plaintiff to prove the employer’s reason to be “false.”231 The dissent,
arguing that a showing of pretext alone should be sufficient to
mandate liability, is even more emphatic, repeatedly characterizing
pretext as showing that the employer has been “caught in a lie,”
“lie[d],” and “offer[ed] false evidence.”232 Likewise, in Reeves, the last
of these cases, the Court again asserts that pretext means that a
plaintiff proves the employer’s asserted justification is “false.”233
Most circuits have developed similar articulations of the
plaintiff’s burden at this third step. For example, the Third Circuit
commonly articulates the test as that the employer’s “proffered
reasons . . . [were] not the real motivation for the unfavorable job
action.”234 The Second Circuit requires “not simply some evidence, but
sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the [defendant] were false,
and that more likely than not [discrimination] was the real reason for
the [employment action].”235 Or, as the Seventh Circuit puts it, “pretext
‘means a lie.’”236 The Sixth Circuit is somewhat more flexible,
suggesting pretext can be established by showing the “proffered
reason . . . (1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the
230. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (emphasis added).
231. St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515–16 (1993); see also id. at 517
(“[P]roving the employer’s reason false becomes part of (and often considerably
assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional
discrimination.”) (emphasis added).
232. See id. at 537–43 (Souter, J., dissenting) (repeatedly characterizing the
majority’s approach as wrongly protecting “the employer who lies,” or is “found to
have given false evidence,” arguing that it ultimately created bad incentives by
providing a “benefit from lying” and a “reward[] for its falsehoods”).
233. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148.
234. Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
235. Cooper v. State of Conn. Pub. Defs. Office, 280 F. App’x 24, 25–26 (2d Cir.
2008) (emphasis added).
236. Chatman v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., No. 20-2882, 2021 WL 3046819, at *746
(7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995)).
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defendant’s challenged conduct, or (3) was insufficient to warrant the
challenged conduct,” but even this formulation assumes the plaintiff
must prove that the claimed rationale did not play a role in the
employer’s action.237 In the past, the Fifth Circuit sometimes
characterized the pretext step more expansively, under an approach
that “merg[ed]” the McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse
approaches,238 but after Gross and Nassar, it appears this test is not
applied in cases that are not proceeding under Title VII’s motivating
factor standard.239
To be sure, courts also sometimes recognize “pretext” as a term
of art. For example, there are cases suggesting that even if an
employee has committed a workplace infraction, pretext may be
shown by establishing other employees who engaged in similar
misconduct were not disciplined,240 that the discipline was clearly
disproportionate to the infraction,241 that the putative reason was a
post hoc rationalization, or that the employer had offered multiple and
inconsistent justifications for its actions.242 But there are also
numerous cases that assume clear evidence of misconduct
functionally dooms a claim, and fail to engage substantively with
evidence that could suggest discriminatory intent was also a cause of
any adverse action.243
It is not surprising that the Supreme Court and lower courts
typically characterize “pretext” as a dishonest or false statement.
237. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 779 (6th Cir. 2016).
238. See Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (specifying
a “modified” McDonnell Douglas that articulated the plaintiff’s burden at the third step
as either showing pretext or that “the defendant’s reason, while true, is only one of the
reasons for its conduct, and another ‘motivating factor’” is a protected trait).
239. See, e.g., Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020)
(characterizing the third step in a retaliation case as requiring a plaintiff to prove
“pretext” by showing that a “discriminatory motive more likely motivated” the
decision, or “that her employer’s explanation is unworthy of credence”).
240. See, e.g., Burton v. Ark. Sec’y of State, 737 F.3d 1219, 1233–35 (8th Cir. 2013).
241. See, e.g., Stalter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 195 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding employer’s claim that it fired a worker for having eaten a handful of Doritos
from an open bag in the lunchroom so disproportionate to the alleged offense that a
jury could infer pretext).
242. See, e.g., Fassbender v. Correct Car Sols., LLC, 890 F.3d 875, 887–90 (10th Cir.
2018).
243. See, e.g., Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 697 (7th Cir. 2006)
(upholding grant of summary judgment to employer because employee “failed to show
[the employer’s] legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for firing her were pretextual”
despite evidence plaintiff’s supervisor repeatedly made disparaging comments about
her age and her Polish national origin).
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Dictionaries confirm that is the standard meaning of pretext, as used
in ordinary speech.244 And if the statutes required a plaintiff to prove
“pretext,” the courts’ description of the plaintiff’s burden would be
quite reasonable.
But the statutes do not require a plaintiff to prove the employer’s
rationale is “pretext.” The statutes simply require a plaintiff to prove
that she was subject to one of the specified adverse employment
actions “because of” a protected trait or protected activity.245 Thus,
although it is appropriate for courts to conclude that proving pretext
will, in most circumstances, be sufficient to satisfy the statutory
standard, the converse is not correct. That is, failing to prove pretext
should not be deemed dispositive. As Part I explains, “because of”
means that the trait or activity must be a but-for cause of a decision.
This standard can be satisfied even if the employer’s claimed
justification is true, and even if it played a role in the decision, so long
as a protected trait or action is also a cause of the action. The judiciallycreated pretext standard, by contrast, rests on the premise that there
will only be one “true” cause of the decision—either the employer’s
rationale or a protected trait or activity. In other words, it functionally
imposes a sole-causation standard.
D. THE MISSING ELEMENT: DISCRIMINATION
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting is so established as the
primary means by which a plaintiff is expected to prove disparate
treatment that it can be easy to overlook a surprising omission—at no
point in the burden-shifting process are courts explicitly instructed to
consider evidence of discriminatory bias. The closest the test comes is
the statement in Burdine that a plaintiff can satisfy her burden at the
third step either by “persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer” or by discrediting the employer’s
claimed justification.246 The Court has also indicated that once the first
two steps are completed, “‘the McDonnell Douglas framework—with
its presumptions and burdens’—disappear[s,] . . . and the sole
remaining issue [is] ‘discrimination vel non.’”247 But the impact of this
statement is significantly blunted by the fact that courts still routinely
244. See, e.g., Pretext, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (3d ed. 1992).
245. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (emphasis added).
246. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
247. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142–43 (2000)
(quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509).
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characterize the test as including a third step, and the primary focus
of analysis in that third step is “pretext.”248
The absence of a step explicitly inviting evidence of
discrimination is particularly striking since—unlike “member of a
protected class” or “qualified” or “comparator” or “pretext”—the
statutory language does explicitly reference discrimination; it is
unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against” an individual
because of a protected trait or protected activity.249
I do not mean to suggest that Title VII’s statutory language, or
other employment discrimination statutes with comparable language,
necessarily requires a plaintiff to prove intentional bias. Although the
Supreme Court and lower courts frequently refer to disparate
treatment claims as requiring proof of “intent,” the statute simply
requires differential treatment “because of” a protected trait or
protected activity.250 Theorists have convincingly argued that where
such differential treatment is proven, it is immaterial whether it may
stem from unconscious or conscious bias, or indeed, from anything
that would be called “bias” at all.251 Likewise, the word “discriminate”
248. See, e.g., Jones v. Okla. City Pub. Schs., 617 F.3d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 2010);
Papelino v. Albany Coll. of Pharmacy, 633 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir. 2011).
249. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. §2000e-3(a); see supra text accompanying
notes 195–97 (explaining that both the status-based provisions and the retaliation
provision use the words “discriminate against,” although the former limits actionable
discrimination to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”).
That said, it is not necessarily clear, as a textual matter, whether the “otherwise to
discriminate against” language modifies the other unlawful actions listed in section
703(a) (i.e., “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual”). See James A. Macleod,
Finding Original Public Meaning, 56 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (making this point);
cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1740 (2020) (flagging this question and
“accepting . . . for argument’s sake” that “discriminate against” modifies the earlier
verbs but not deciding the matter). However, that question does not affect the larger
point made in the text; evidence of biased statements, epithets, or slurs made by the
decisionmaker would logically inform the consideration of whether a firing or refusal
to hire was made “because of” a protected trait or activity and also whether such firing
or refusal to hire was an example of “discrimination” because of the trait or activity.
250. In Bostock, Justice Gorsuch arguably flags the extent to which the “intent”
requirement might go beyond the statutory language by first defining discrimination
and then stating that “[i]n so-called ‘disparate treatment’ cases like today’s, this Court
has also held that the difference in treatment based on sex must be intentional.”
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
251. See, e.g., Eyer, supra note 23, at 38 (arguing a showing of intentional
discrimination is not necessary under the but-for standard); cf. David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 922–23 (1993)
(characterizing conscious intent as the “touchstone” of the Supreme Court’s disparate
treatment case law but critiquing this approach and arguing for a standard that would
recognize negligent discrimination).
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can mean differential treatment without any reference to intent or
cause, as well as differential treatment based on membership in a
group.252 For purposes of this project, it is not necessary to resolve
which definition of discrimination is applicable, or the larger question
of whether intent is required.
My point is much more basic. Where there is evidence of
discriminatory bias, in the sense of prejudice against an individual
based on a trait listed in the statute, it should inform whether a
challenged action has been taken “because” of that trait. This is true
even if the biased statements were not made in the specific context of
the challenged decision. However, such evidence often falls into a gap
between the various tests used to resolve such claims, and therefore
is deemed of little importance, or even legally irrelevant.253
This problem arises from the decision tree used to resolve most
employment discrimination claims. As a threshold matter, a court will
determine whether a plaintiff has provided “direct” evidence of
discrimination—i.e., an explicit statement by the decisionmaker that
she relied on a protected trait or activity in making a decision.254 If this
evidence exists, the court does not apply McDonnell Douglas burdenshifting at all.255 But cases with this kind of “smoking gun” evidence
are, understandably, rare.256
Cases that lack direct evidence of discrimination are typically
funneled through McDonnell Douglas.257 The burden-shifting process
will effectively identify one way to prove “differential” treatment—
evidence that a similarly-situated comparator who does not share the
relevant protected trait was treated differently. It also establishes the
important principle that it is reasonable to infer that if an employer’s
proffered justification is untrue, it may well be covering up invidious

252. Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740 (explaining that the word “discriminate” is typically
defined to include both simply drawing a distinction, and the act or practice of drawing
a distinction “categorically rather than individually” by quoting dictionary definitions
encompassing both meanings without resolving which applies, but highlighting that
the statute protects individuals rather than groups). Even the latter definition, focusing
on differential treatment based on membership in a group, could encompass
differential treatment caused by implicit or unconscious bias, as well as “intentional”
bias.
253. See infra text accompanying notes 260–71.
254. See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Serv. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015).
255. Id.
256. See, e.g., Zachary J. Strongin, Fleeing the Rat’s Nest: Title VII Jurisprudence After
Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 83 BROOK. L. REV. 725, 733 (2018).
257. Young, 135 S. Ct. at 1345.

2021]

PROVING DISCRIMINATION BY THE TEXT

393

bias.258 But the test does not explicitly reference other ways that a
plaintiff might prove discrimination. For example, it would also be
reasonable to infer that if the relevant decisionmaker routinely uses
epithets or slurs, or relies on stereotypical assumptions regarding a
relevant trait, or has tolerated others doing so without signaling
disapproval, that decisionmaker may hold bias that could infect an
employment decision. This is likewise true if such bias is expressed by
a supervisor or coworker whose assessment of the plaintiff helps spur
the adverse action, even if that person is not the ultimate
decisionmaker.259
Judges, however, have created a “stray remarks” doctrine, which
holds that such biased statements are not only insufficient to
constitute direct evidence, but also that they are irrelevant, as a matter
of law, to assessing whether an employer’s actions were
discriminatory.260 Thus, they are brushed aside in the context of
summary judgment, and in cases that go to trial, they may be excluded
from the jury’s consideration entirely.261
Egregious examples abound. For example, in one case, the
plaintiff alleged that in the months leading up to her termination, her
supervisor repeatedly said she was “too Polish” and “too old.”262 The
court held that these comments were not direct evidence because her
supervisor did not make a comparable statement at the moment he
fired her, and then they were held to have no relevance in assessing
the legitimacy of the employer’s claimed justification for its action
under McDonnell Douglas.263 In another case, an employee alleged his
258. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 147–48 (2000).
259. Cf. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 418 (2011) (explaining the standard
under which such bias by a subsidiary can give rise to a statutory violation). This
problem, known as “cat’s paw liability,” is relatively common. The Supreme Court’s
only discussion of the issue arose under the statute prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of military service, a statute which, like Title VII, includes explicit “motivating
factor” language. This has given rise to confusion in the lower courts about how this
doctrine interacts with causation doctrine. See generally Sandra F. Sperino, Caught by
the Cat’s Paw, 2019 BYU L. REV. 1219.
260. See Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment
Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149, 150 n.6 (2012)
(collecting representative cases).
261. See, e.g., Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 23, 36 (1st Cir. 2001)
(“[M]ere generalized ‘stray remarks,’ arguably probative of bias against a protected
class, normally are not probative of pretext absent some discernible evidentiary basis
for assessing their temporal and contextual relevance.”) (emphasis omitted) (citations
omitted).
262. Ptasznik v. St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2006).
263. Id. at 695–96.
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supervisor had asked him “whether he had “a harem” or “rode camels
around everywhere in Egypt,” and repeatedly belittled him in front of
coworkers and customers.264 The comments were deemed to have “no
connection to the decisional process,” and thus characterized as
irrelevant to the pretext analysis.265 In a third case, multiple women
complained about a male supervisor.266 One alleged he commented on
“all the female Barbie dolls” in the pharmaceutical industry, and
suggested it was appropriate to “let the pretty girls go first.”267 She
also said he called her the “pretty redheaded Lilly rep,” and said
doctors must love seeing her.268 A second said he excluded her from a
meeting with an important doctor because it was a “guys [sic]
meeting.”269 The women, and a third co-plaintiff, alleged other ways
in which they felt they were treated less favorably because of their sex,
and, in some cases, their race as well.270 The court, however, viewed
each woman as largely isolated from the others, and held none had
sufficient evidence to suggest discrimination.271
The stray remarks doctrine, as well as the formulation of the
burden in the third step of McDonnell Douglas as proving either
pretext or discriminatory intent, suggests that the two inquiries are
unrelated. In fact, evidence of routinely biased comments by a
supervisor should be grounds to question the credibility of a
nominally legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale, particularly one
that relies on subjective assessments of the plaintiff’s work by the
same decisionmaker. More generally, as Professor Kerri Lynn Stone
has argued, this doctrine fails to comport with basic social science
about how bias operates.272 Nor is the problem limited to statutory
antidiscrimination law; rather, as Professor Jessica Clarke shows,
constitutional doctrine also often excludes statements of explicit
bias.273

264.
2007).
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
(2018).

Elnashar v. Speedway SuperAmerica, LLC, 484 F.3d 1046, 1050 (8th Cir.
Id. at 1055.
Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly, 636 F. App’x 831, 835 (3d Cir. 2016).
Id. at 835.
Id.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 835–39.
Id. at 842–46.
Stone, supra note 260, at 184–89.
See generally Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 525–40
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These and similar critiques of the stray remarks doctrine are
well-founded.274 Here, too, there is a serious mismatch between the
statute’s mandate and McDonnell Douglas. Statements by a decisionmaker expressing bias are obviously relevant to the statutory
standard—i.e., whether an adverse action against a plaintiff was
discriminatory. But it may be that at least part of the reason why
courts routinely discount such evidence is that McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting never explicitly invites it.
The McDonnell Douglas test also fails to consider timing, outside
of the retaliation context.275 Close temporal proximity between an
employer’s learning of a protected trait that may not be generally
evident (such as pregnancy, disability, or sexual orientation) and an
adverse action could suggest that the adverse action happened
“because of” the relevant trait. But the standard articulation of the
McDonnell Douglas test used for status-based claims does not
explicitly invite such analysis. Instead, under the stray remarks
doctrine, courts generally deem discriminatory comments uttered
even shortly before an adverse action to be too removed to be relevant
to proving “pretext.”276 Professor Sandra Sperino highlights that this
is part of a larger pattern of evidentiary inequality, in that courts will
often consider evidence of employee misconduct even years earlier to
be support for an employer’s claimed legitimate justification.277
The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits developed an alternative to
McDonnell Douglas that makes these gaps evident. Under this
framework, typically used when a plaintiff cannot identify a
comparator and thus cannot satisfy the prima facie case, courts assess
whether the circumstantial evidence creates a “convincing mosaic”
akin to “direct” evidence.278 (The Seventh Circuit has since disclaimed
the metaphor, but retained the basic idea.279) Courts typically identify
274. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 25, at 209–13 (discussing additional critiques).
275. In the retaliation context, the standard articulation of McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting asks how soon the adverse action occurred after the plaintiff made a
complaint or engaged in other protected conduct. See, e.g., id. at 244–45.
276. See Sandra Sperino, Evidentiary Inequality (Jan. 28, 2021), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3775160 [https://perma.cc/QAK4-SFTZ].
277. Id.
278. See, e.g., Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1327–38 (11th Cir.
2011) (applying the “convincing mosaic” standard after concluding plaintiff had failed
to identify a sufficiently similar comparator); Rhodes v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 359 F.3d
498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004).
279. See infra text accompanying note 345; see also Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Schs.,
953 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2020) (referencing these categories of evidence as relevant
to assessing discrimination).
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three categories of evidence that could help build the mosaic: (1) that
similarly-situated persons were treated differently; (2) that an
employer’s rationale was pretextual; and (3) evidence of “suspicious
timing, ambiguous statements . . . and other bits and pieces from
which an inference of discriminatory intent might be drawn.”280
Notably, the only category that does not have a direct corollary in the
standard McDonnell Douglas test is the third: suspicious timing,
ambiguous statements, and other “bits and pieces from which an
inference of intent might be drawn.” Such evidence will often suggest
an individual was subject to “discriminat[ion] against” her.281
Refocusing on the operative language of the statute, rather than the
judicially-created tests, helps make clear its salience.
III. INTEGRATING CAUSATION
AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
Part I described the Supreme Court’s careful consideration, based
on relevant statutory language, of the causation standard that governs
employment discrimination cases. It established that in most
instances, a plaintiff is, at most, required to prove a protected trait or
activity made a difference to the outcome. Under this standard, it
should be irrelevant whether legitimate factors also played a role. Part
II showed that McDonnell Douglas, by contrast, is premised on the
(generally inaccurate) assumption that there will be only a single
motive for a challenged decision, and that a plaintiff typically is
expected to prove the employer’s claimed rationale is false. These
distinct approaches are difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile. This
Part explains the tensions between them and argues that McDonnell
Douglas and related judge-created doctrines must be clarified to
conform to the statutory standard—or simply abandoned.
A. FALSE DICHOTOMIES
McDonnell Douglas is typically described as the appropriate
method to use at summary judgment for what are known as “singlemotive” cases that rely on “circumstantial” evidence.282 A decision
authored by Justice Gorsuch when he served on the Tenth Circuit
highlights these limitations, in the context of arguing against
exporting the test to a different statutory context:
280. See Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
(citing Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2011)).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
282. Walton v. Powell, 821 F.3d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 2016).
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This court has expressly declined to employ McDonnell Douglas . . . in Title VII
cases at or after trial because of the confusion and complexities its
application can invite . . . . In the summary judgment context, too,
where McDonnell Douglas is sometimes applied, it is only sometimes applied.
We have used McDonnell Douglas in cases relying on circumstantial evidence
but we will not use it in cases relying on direct evidence (and so have had to
engage in the business of trying to police the often fine line between these
kinds of evidence) . . . . And still then, in the narrow remaining class of
(summary judgment, circumstantial-proof) cases, it may be that McDonnell
Douglas is properly used only when the plaintiff alleges a “single” unlawful
motive—and not “mixed motives”—lurking behind an adverse employment
decision . . . .283

This exposition exposes the difficult, if not incoherent, distinctions the
test calls on courts to make between “single-motive” and “mixedmotive” cases and between “circumstantial” and “direct” evidence.
The deeper truth is that the embedded associations—of
circumstantial evidence with “single-motive” cases and direct
evidence with “mixed-motive” cases—are anachronistic relics of the
way in which the doctrine developed. These are false dichotomies that
should be repudiated in favor of a single standard based on the
statutory language.
To understand why and how these associations developed, it is
helpful to consider the historical context leading up to the watershed
cases of McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse in historical context.
Prior to the enactment of Title VII, it was common—and, absent
applicable state or local antidiscrimination law, legal—for employers
to openly discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and other personal
characteristics. Thus, for example, certain jobs were explicitly limited
to white applicants,284 or male applicants.285 Even if an employer did
not have a formal policy in place, decisionmakers could explicitly
make decisions on the basis of these traits with impunity, or simply
decline to provide any reason for a decision.286
Title VII made reliance on the protected traits illegal, aside from
a limited exception for jobs in which an employer could prove that sex,
283. Id. at 1210–11 (citations omitted).
284. E.g., Ruth G. Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation, and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 397, 409 (1979); cf. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 426 (1971) (describing race-based segregation of jobs at a
power plant prior to Title VII’s effective date).
285. See, e.g., Nicholas Pedriana & Amanda Abraham, Now You See Them, Now You
Don’t: The Legal Field and Newspaper Desegregation of Sex-Segregated Help Wanted Ads
1965–75, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 905, 906 (2006).
286. See, e.g., Stephen G. Bullock, The Focal Issue: Discriminatory Motivation or
Adverse Impact, 34 LA. L. REV. 572 (1974).
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religion, or national origin was a “bona fide occupational
qualification.”287 By outlawing overt discrimination, Title VII greatly
expanded economic opportunity for previously disadvantaged
groups. But it did not end discrimination. One problem was that
facially neutral hiring criteria—such as educational requirements or
aptitude tests—often had the effect of disadvantaging minority
groups.288 The Court held that such policies, even if not adopted with
discriminatory intent, were illegal unless the employer could prove
that they were job-related and a business necessity.289
Some employers continued intentional discrimination without
admitting that they were doing so.290 This was particularly easy if an
employer never had to justify its actions. McDonnell Douglas
addressed this latter problem: What would be required to establish a
violation of the statute where there was no direct evidence of
discriminatory intent, only circumstantial evidence? By requiring an
employer to articulate a justification for its decision, and then
acknowledging that a claimed justification could nonetheless be a
pretext covering up discriminatory intent, McDonnell Douglas
provided a framework for organizing and analyzing evidence in such
cases.291 Furthermore, it established that if an employer dissembled
regarding its justifications, it was reasonable to infer that the real
reason for an action was discriminatory bias.292
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court framed the company’s refusal to
rehire Percy Green as based on a single motive: either (as the company
claimed) Percy Green’s illegal activities or (as Percy Green claimed)
his race.293 In the Court’s words, these were “opposing factual
contentions,” and the issue on remand would be which was better
supported by the evidence.294 As discussed below, this
287. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). The bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
defense cannot be used to justify discrimination on the basis of race or color.
288. E.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 428–31.
289. Id. at 436. Griggs was not very explicit about the textual basis of its holding,
although the Court later signaled that it understood the holding to rest on section
703(a)(2). See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 445–49 (1982). In any event, Congress
later ratified the disparate impact doctrine explicitly, so whether or not it initially had
a firm basis in the text, it clearly does at this point. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k).
290. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (concluding that
company continued pre-Title VII practice of discriminating on the basis of race and
national origin long after the Act took effect).
291. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1972).
292. Id. at 804.
293. Id. at 801.
294. Id.
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characterization is flawed. It was almost certain that the company’s
refusal to rehire Green was based, at least in part, on his illegal
activities, even if it may have also been based on his race.295 That said,
in the absence of any “direct” evidence of discrimination, it is at least
conceptually coherent, even if empirically incorrect, to suggest a
challenged decision is based on either nondiscriminatory criteria or a
protected trait.
This is different when there is “direct” evidence that an
employment decision is based on a protected trait or activity. Under a
single-motive framework, such a decision would—by definition—be
illegal, other than the limited exception addressed in the BFOQ
defense.296 However, as Price Waterhouse illustrated, in many cases,
there will be “direct” evidence of discriminatory bias, but reason to
think legitimate nondiscriminatory factors also played a role.297 This
reality came to be known as “mixed-motive” cases, as the existence of
“direct” evidence made it impossible to pretend that a court’s job was
discerning a single motive for a challenged decision. The association
was further bolstered by Justice O’Connor’s concurrence (which many
circuits treated as providing the necessary fifth vote and thus
controlling),298 as it suggested the burden would only shift to the
employer to prove that it would have taken the same action anyway
in instances in which there was “direct” evidence.299
Price Waterhouse also solidified the idea that McDonnell Douglas,
as then recently interpreted in Burdine, was concerned with ferreting
out a single, illicit motive. According to the Price Waterhouse plurality,
adopting the standard burden-shifting process in a “mixed-motive”
case would “insist that Burdine’s framework perform work it was
never intended to perform,” in that it would “require a plaintiff who
challenges an adverse employment decision in which both legitimate
and illegitimate considerations played a part to pretend that the
decision . . . stemmed from a single source—for the premise of Burdine
is that either a legitimate or illegitimate set of considerations led to the
challenged decision.”300 Justice White similarly opined that McDonnell

295. See infra text accompanying notes 303–05.
296. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
297. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 (1989).
298. See, e.g., Erickson v. Farmland Indus., Inc., 271 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 2001)
(characterizing the rule as coming from Justice O’Connor’s “controlling concurrence”
in Price Waterhouse).
299. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 275 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
300. Id. at 247.
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Douglas burden-shifting would be inapposite in a case including
mixed motives.301
But this premise is flawed. Although it’s true that the Court in
McDonnell Douglas referred to “opposing factual contentions,”302
McDonnell Douglas was almost certainly also a mixed-motive case,
albeit one that lacked any direct evidence of discrimination. It was
undisputed that Percy Green had participated in illegal actions against
the company.303 And it was equally clear that the company was not
categorically opposed to hiring Blacks, and that Green was qualified
for the position, since the company had hired Green in the past.304
Accordingly, it seems very likely that Green’s participation in the
protests was a factor in the company’s refusal to rehire him. It was
probably even a but-for cause: If he had not participated in the
protests, he would have been rehired. But race may also have been a
but-for cause of the decision. This was suggested by the fact that white
employees who had participated in similar illegal activity were
treated more favorably.305 In other words, the evidence suggested
there may have been two independent but-for causes of the
challenged action.
As this example makes clear, even in cases that rely on
circumstantial evidence to try to prove discrimination, the evidence
will often suggest there are multiple motivations for an employment
decision. In fact, McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting almost
guarantees this will be the rule rather than the exception. A plaintiff’s
prima facie case, and whatever additional evidence the plaintiff
introduces at the third step of the process, is evidence suggesting
discrimination. And whatever evidence the employer introduces to
support its claimed justification is evidence suggesting a nondiscriminatory rationale for the decision. Thus, in virtually all cases,
the evidence will suggest there are multiple—i.e., mixed—motives.
301. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
302. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
303. Id. at 794.
304. Id. at 802.
305. Green argued that numerous white employees who had participated in unionorganized strikes and picketing resulting in traffic slowdowns were treated more
favorably than he was. The Supreme Court opined that this evidence could suggest
racial discrimination if the acts were of “comparable seriousness.” McDonnell Douglas,
411 U.S. at 804. On remand, the trial court made a factual conclusion that union
members’ actions were not “comparable.” Green v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 390 F.
Supp. 501, 503 (E.D. Mo. 1975), aff’d, 528 F.2d 1102 (8th Cir. 1976). Nonetheless, the
point remains that there was significant evidence from which a reasonable fact finder
might have concluded racial animus played a role in the refusal to rehire Green.
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Nonetheless, it is common, particularly since Gross, for courts to assert
that “mixed motive” cases are not cognizable under the ADEA, ADA, or
any other statute that requires a showing of but-for causation.306 This
is, quite simply, incorrect. It is imperative that the Court address this
confusion.
B. REAL TENSION
The previous Section exposed false dichotomies underlying the
assumption that cases decided under McDonnell Douglas include only
a single motive. But decades of decisions characterizing the “pretext”
stage as requiring a plaintiff to disprove the employer’s claimed
rationale make clear that, as applied, the test does require narrowing
actions down to a single motive. Thus, the judge-made doctrine
functionally requires a plaintiff to prove sole-causation, whereas the
statutory language simply requires but-for causation.
Until recently, courts have failed to grapple with this disconnect.
That began to change after Gross and Nassar, as lower courts deciding
age discrimination and retaliation claims indicated they were unsure
“where” but-for causation fits within McDonnell Douglas. In both
contexts, some courts held but-for causation applies to the final
element of the prima facie case, and some have located the
requirement at the pretext stage.307 Some have flagged confusion, but
deemed it unnecessary to resolve to decide the case,308 or mentioned
both, but failed to substantively engage with how they interact.309
306. See, e.g., Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“Clearly, Nassar significantly altered the causation standard for claims based on direct
evidence of retaliatory animus by rejecting the ‘mixed motive’ theory of liability for
retaliation claims.”); Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[A] plaintiff complaining of discriminatory discharge under the ADA must
show that his or her employer would not have fired him but for his actual or perceived
disability; proof of mixed motives will not suffice.”).
307. See, e.g., Foster, 787 F.3d at 251 n.10 (collecting cases demonstrating a circuit
split on retaliation claims); see also SPERINO, supra note 25, at 245–50 (collecting cases
demonstrating a circuit split on retaliation claims); Green v. Town of East Haven, 952
F.3d 394, 403 (2d Cir. 2020) (stating but-for cause applies in the prima facie case in
the ADEA context); Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc., 952 F.3d 795, 810 (6th Cir. 2020)
(stating but-for causation applies at the pretext step).
308. E.g., Heisler v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 931 F.3d 786, 794–95 (8th Cir. 2019).
This case suggests, incorrectly, that but-for causation is actually a more stringent
standard than McDonnell Douglas, but the court seems to be equating but-for causation
to sole-causation.
309. See, e.g., Zabala-De Jesus v. Sanofi-Aventis P.R., Inc., 959 F.3d 423, 428–29 (1st
Cir. 2020); Hess v. Mid Hudson Valley StaffCo LLC, 776 F. App’x 36, 36–37 (2d Cir.
2019).
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Bostock, however, demonstrates the issue is not simply “where” butfor causation fits. Rather, in clarifying the difference between but-for
causation and sole causation, Bostock reveals the real question is
whether the standard articulation of the pretext step can be
reconciled with but-for causation at all.
An (unpublished) Ninth Circuit decision, issued just weeks after
Bostock, highlights the issue and resolves it appropriately. First, the
court relied on Bostock to emphasize that there can be multiple butfor causes of a decision, and that the evidence should be considered
holistically.310 The court drew a connection between this recognition
and a level of flexibility in the pretext analysis, quoting earlier circuit
precedent that “a plaintiff’s burden to raise a triable issue of pretext is
‘hardly an onerous one.’”311 And then, since the facts suggested it was
at least plausible that plaintiff’s termination was retaliation for an
earlier complaint, the court reversed the district court’s grant of
summary judgment.312
By contrast, the dissenting judge on the panel, who would have
granted summary judgment, characterized the plaintiff’s burden as an
either-or proposition: “To win on a Title VII retaliation claim,
employees must show that their engagement in protected activity—
and not the employer’s stated rationale—was the ‘but-for’ cause of
their termination.”313 The dissent suggested Bostock was in tension
with the Court’s earlier causation decisions, such as Nassar.314
A Sixth Circuit case takes this flawed reasoning one step further,
holding that Bostock’s explication of the meaning of but-for cause—
and the differences between but-for cause and sole cause—simply
does not apply to the ADEA.315 Quoting language from Gross, which
stated that a plaintiff would need to prove “that age was the ‘but-for’
cause of a decision,” the court held that Bostock’s reasoning was
limited to Title VII.316 In other words, the court suggested, “because
of” in Title VII means a plaintiff can win by showing a protected trait
was a but-for cause of the decision, whereas “because of” in the ADEA
requires a plaintiff to prove the protected trait was the but-for cause
310. Black v. Grant Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist., 820 F. App’x 547, 551–52 (9th Cir. 2020).
311. Id. at 551 (quoting Earl v. Nielson Media Rsch., Inc., 658 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th
Cir. 2011)).
312. Black, 820 F. App’x at 550–51.
313. Id. at 553 (Bumatay, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
314. Id. at 554.
315. Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 323–24 (6th Cir. 2021).
316. Id. at 323 (quoting Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009))
(emphasis added).

2021]

PROVING DISCRIMINATION BY THE TEXT

403

of the decision. This decision superseded the panel’s original decision
in the case, in which the court had said bluntly: “Under Gross, either a
termination is motivated by age, or it wasn’t.”317 Although the
subsequent decision removed this sentence, it did not change its
substance. In essence, the court articulated a standard that
functionally required a plaintiff to prove age was the only cause of an
adverse action. As Part I explains, this is simply incorrect. Although
the Court in Gross used a definite article—”the”—when it should have
used an indefinite article—”a”—it has long been established, both
before and after Gross, that but-for cause is different from sole cause,
and that there can be multiple but-for causes of an action or a
decision.318 That said, the confusion expressed by lower courts is not
surprising, especially since common articulations of the “pretext” step
suggest a plaintiff must disprove the rationale offered by the
employer.
Since 2009, the Supreme Court has decided four cases by
meticulously analyzing the causation standards under employment
discrimination statutes.319 But none of those decisions substantively
engage with how to reconcile causation with McDonnell Douglas,
beyond a passing statement in Comcast that McDonnell Douglas “arose
in a context where but-for causation was the undisputed text.”320 In
part, this reflects the procedural posture of the cases. Gross and Nassar
were appeals from trial verdicts, and Comcast was an appeal from a
motion to dismiss.321 Even in Babb and Bostock, where the Court was
reviewing decisions on summary judgment, the Court granted
certiorari on narrow legal questions that did not raise directly how
but-for causation relates to McDonnell Douglas.322
By clarifying that there can be multiple but-for causes for a
decision, Bostock makes the tensions more apparent. This is why it is
essential that the Supreme Court or circuit courts clarify that
formulations of “pretext” that suggest a plaintiff must disprove the
defendant’s claimed rationale are incorrect, and also that under all of
317. Pelcha v. MC Bancorp., Inc., 984 F.3d 1199, 1205 (6th Cir. 2021), superseded
by Pelcha, 988 F.3d 318.
318. See supra Parts I.A–C.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 72–78.
320. Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Assoc. of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019
(2020).
321. Gross, 557 U.S. at 170–71; Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338,
345 (2013); Comcast Corp., 140 S. Ct. at 1013.
322. Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168, 1172 (2020); Bostock v. Clayton Cnty. 140 S.
Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020).
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the relevant employment discrimination statutes where but-for
causation is applied, a plaintiff simply must prove a protected trait or
activity was a but-for cause of the decision, not the only but-for cause
of a decision.
Beyond the disconnect between but-for cause and common
articulations of the pretext test, the McDonnell Douglas test—with its
multiple distinct elements, disagreement about precisely what the
various elements require, and the uncertainty about when it applies—
creates unnecessary litigation at all levels of the courts. As early as
1979, the First Circuit observed that the “mechanics of the burden
shifting in McDonnell Douglas . . . have caused no little difficulty among
courts.”323 It is fair to say the situation has not improved.
C. “MIDDLE-DOWN” REFORM
Lower courts typically consider themselves to be bound to apply
McDonnell Douglas, even if they find it unhelpful. A Tenth Circuit case
illustrates this tension well. Judge Harris Hartz authored the panel
decision, which employed McDonnell Douglas.324 He also authored a
separate opinion, which began: “I write separately to express my
displeasure with the mode of analysis employed in the panel opinion
(which I authored).”325 In this separate opinion, he suggested
McDonnell Douglas “only creates confusion” and “should be
abandoned.”326 More typically, judges use concurrences327 or law
review articles to make such critiques, arguing that the test is
inefficient, convoluted, and distracts courts from focusing on the real
issue, which is whether a plaintiff can establish an action was based
on illicit discrimination.328

323. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011 (1st Cir. 1979).
324. See Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003).
325. Id. at 1221.
326. Id.
327. E.g., Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co., 917 F.3d 335, 350 (5th Cir. 2019) (Costa, J.,
concurring) (describing McDonnell Douglas as the “kudzu” of employment
discrimination law, resistant to judicial efforts to curtail its spread); see also SPERINO,
supra note 25, at 317–27 (collecting judicial criticism).
328. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 218, at 677–78; Denny Chin & Jodi Golinsky, Moving
Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in
Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 671–72 (1998); Timothy M. Tymkovich,
The Problem with Pretext, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 503, 519 (2008); see also Gertner, supra
note 21(critiquing many of the subsidiary doctrines used in the doctrine).
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Dissatisfaction with the test spans the ideological spectrum.329
For example, before being named to the Supreme Court, Justices
Kavanaugh and Gorsuch each wrote decisions highlighting the
confusion caused by McDonnell Douglas and its disconnect from
relevant statutory standards.330 Similar criticisms have been made by
prominent, liberal-leaning judges, including two frequently
mentioned as leading candidates for a Supreme Court nomination by
President Obama.331
Academic commentators have also long called for reform. In the
1990s, after the Court’s series of decisions assessing the relevance of
demonstrating pretext, Deborah Malamud wrote a comprehensive
analysis of the doctrine as it stood then, and concluded it should no
longer be used.332 In the wake of Desert Palace, which held that
plaintiffs could use either circumstantial or direct evidence under the
motivating factor standard, many academic commentators argued
(and expected) that the motivating factor standard would entirely
replace McDonnell Douglas.333 More recent scholarship continues to
highlight problems with the standard,334 as well as sub-doctrines such
as the comparator requirement and the stray-remarks doctrine.335
329. All such critiques tend to emphasize the confusion and redundancies of the
test. There is arguably more of an ideological split in the relevance that judges deem it
appropriate to ascribe to establishing the employer’s justification was pretextual if
there is not additional evidence suggesting discriminatory intent.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 215 and 283. Judge Timothy Tymkovich,
who authored a lengthy law review article critiquing the standard, was also on the list
of potential nominees released by President Trump. See Tymkovich, supra note 328.
See Complete List of Donald Trump’s Potential Nominees to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Ballotpedia, https://ballotpedia.org/Complete_list_of_Donald_Trump%27s_potential_
nominees_to_the_U.S._Supreme_Court [https://perma.cc/4DXM-RRYS].
331. Judge Diane Wood, author of the Coleman concurrence discussed infra notes
340–52, and Judge Denny Chin, author of two law review articles criticizing the
doctrine, see supra note 328, were each identified as potential Obama nominees. E.g.,
Kristina Moore, Nominee Analysis: Judge Diane Wood, SCOTUSBLOG (May 20, 2009),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2009/05/nominee-analysis-judge-diane-wood
[https://perma.cc/U6C6-3KQC]; Jin Y. Hwang, Time Is Right for an Asian Pacific
American Supreme Court Nominee, HILL (Feb. 19, 2016), https://thehill.com/
blogs/congress-blog/judicial/269949-time-is-right-for-an-asian-pacific-american
-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/2P4Q-6J7V] (suggesting Chin as a Supreme Court
nominee).
332. See Malamud, supra note 25, at 2311–13.
333. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973–2003: May You Rest in
Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199 (2003); Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment
(Really), 59 HASTINGS L.J. 643 (2007).
334. See generally sources cites supra note 25.
335. See generally sources cited supra notes 180 and 260.
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Statements by individual judges or academics (including the
author of this Article) may identify problems and suggest solutions,
but they do not on their own transform doctrine. That requires clearer
directives from a court empowered to set policy for itself and courts
lower than it in the hierarchy. In the federal system, the circuit courts
have such authority, which I have termed “middle-down” reform. And
the Seventh Circuit has endeavored to address the false dichotomies
and confusion caused by McDonnell Douglas. Its efforts to clarify and
simplify the analysis in discrimination cases highlight both the
possibilities and limitations of reform at the circuit court—rather than
the Supreme Court—level.
As discussed earlier, in the 1990s, the Seventh Circuit began
employing a “convincing mosaic” approach as an alternative to
McDonnell Douglas.336 This directed courts to assess whether the
circumstantial evidence as a whole created a “convincing mosaic” akin
to “direct” evidence. While this approach could have plausibly been
used in all cases, it was not. Instead, litigants and courts continued to
prioritize McDonnell Douglas, but, if there was any question as to
whether a comparator would be deemed acceptable, or whether
evidence would be considered direct, multiple tests would be
applied.337 As is probably obvious, this meant that briefs and decisions
were often very repetitive, with the same or similar evidence being
plugged into the distinct tests, and sometimes repeated within the
same test.
In 2012, in a case called Coleman v. Donahoe, the lead opinion
went through all of the steps of McDonnell Douglas on sex and race
discrimination claims,338 and it employed the “convincing mosaic”
approach to address a separate retaliation claim.339 In the process, the
court painstakingly corrected common errors regarding application of
the comparator prong of the prima facie case, and the misconception
that evidence used to establish the prima facie case could not be “reused” for the pretext step.340 None of the judges on the panel
dissented, but all three judges, including the author of the lead
opinion, signed onto a concurrence that criticized the “snarls and
knots that the current methodologies used in discrimination cases of
336. See supra text accompanying notes 278–280.
337. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012) (applying multiple
different tests).
338. See id. at 845–59.
339. See id. at 859–62.
340. See id. at 846–52, 857–59.
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all kinds have inflicted on courts and litigants alike.”341 It argued “the
various tests that we insist lawyers use have lost their utility,” and
suggested that it was time to “collapse all these tests into one.”342
After Coleman, shifting panels of Seventh Circuit judges engaged
in a striking conversation—conducted through a series of appellate
decisions—as to the merits of moving to a single, simple standard. All
of the active judges expressed support for rejecting the distinction
between direct and circumstantial evidence and the “convincing
mosaic” metaphor.343 Some also suggested discontinuing, or at least
firmly discouraging, use of McDonnell Douglas, but others opined that
it was binding Supreme Court precedent that they had no power to
disclaim.344
A case called Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc. brought this
discussion to an end.345 The Seventh Circuit instructed lower courts to
abandon the “convincing mosaic” approach, overruled several prior
precedents suggesting that the distinction between “direct” and
“indirect” evidence had salience, and instructed lower courts that they
should determine “whether the evidence would permit a reasonable
factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff’s [protected trait] caused the
discharge or other adverse employment action” by considering the
“[e]vidence . . . as a whole . . . .”346 This wording properly focuses
analysis on the statutory requirement, rather than judicially-created
tests. Indeed, it is quite similar to the reform I suggest in Part IV.
However, Ortiz did not try to reconcile this statutory-based
standard with McDonnell Douglas (which, for the reasons stated in the
previous Section, would be difficult).347 Rather, it simply stated that
341. Id. at 863 (Wood, J., concurring).
342. Id.
343. See Ortiz v. Werner Enter., Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2016) (“During the
last decade, every member of this court has disapproved both the multiple methods
and the search for mosaics.”). Because Ortiz overruled earlier panel decisions, it was
circulated before release to all of the active justices in the circuit; none favored a
hearing en banc. Id. at 767.
344. Compare Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724 F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The [more
unified ‘direct’ method], it seems to us, should be the default rule.”), with Orton-Bell v.
Indiana, 759 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2014) (“While all relevant direct and
circumstantial evidence is considered (in its “totality”) in both methods, we do indeed
consider the ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ methods separately when reviewing summary
judgment because we are not ‘authorized to abjure a framework that the Supreme
Court has established.’”).
345. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 764–65.
346. Id. at 765.
347. Below I discuss ways in which lower courts, or the Supreme Court, could
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its new standard “does not concern McDonnell Douglas.”348 The result
has been that it is now common practice for district courts in the
Seventh Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit itself, to discuss both
McDonnell Douglas and Ortiz. One recent Seventh Circuit decision
forgoes McDonnell Douglas and only applies Ortiz,349 but more
typically the analysis focuses primarily on McDonnell Douglas, and
Ortiz is treated as an afterthought.350 Thus, the reform effort has been,
at best, a partial success.
The D.C. Circuit provides another example of circuit court efforts
to address the confusion caused by McDonnell Douglas. As discussed
above, in 2008, it declared the prima facie case an “unnecessary
sideshow” so long as the defendant has articulated a legitimate
rationale for its actions.351 The D.C. Circuit did not simply permit lower
court judges to forego this step. Rather, it directly instructed them to
discontinue using this portion of the test.352 Review of D.C. Circuit case
law suggests that lower courts heeded this instruction. In the Circuit,
district courts no longer address the prima facie case, other than
assessing whether a plaintiff can show she suffered an adverse
employment action that meets the statutory standard.353 This is only
a partial solution to the problems identified in this Article, as it does
not address the mismatch between the pretext stage and but-for
causation. However, it does illustrate that lower courts, if clearly
instructed, can and will change their practices. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has not interceded to require the D.C. Circuit to once
again consider the prima facie case.

clarify aspects of the burden-shifting process to better accord with the statutory
language, but ultimately I suggest that the cleaner and better solution may be to simply
overrule McDonnell Douglas. See infra text accompanying note 362 and Part III.D.
348. Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 766. (“Today’s decision does not concern McDonnell
Douglas . . . .”).
349. See Joll v. Valparaiso Cmty. Schs., 953 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2020).
350. See, e.g., Marshall v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 789, 792–93 (7th Cir. 2020)
(discussing in detail why the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because
proposed comparators were insufficient and then cursorily concluding that
“considering all the evidence in a single Ortiz pile,” plaintiff also failed to show
discrimination); Reymore v. Marian Univ., No. 1:16-CV-00102-SEB-DML 2017 WL
4340352 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017) (indicating the court “struggle[s] to reconcile the
Seventh’s Circuit’s clear preference for a single, simplified approach . . . with the
continued . . . applicability of . . . McDonnell Douglas” and ultimately just applies
McDonnell Douglas).
351. Brady v. Off. of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
352. Id.
353. See cases cited supra note 217.
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These two examples suggest circuit courts, at least, have more
flexibility than they seem to perceive. Even if circuits are
uncomfortable abandoning McDonnell Douglas entirely, they could
adopt the articulation of the prima facie case that simply requires a
plaintiff to identify “circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination”354 rather than requiring a comparator, or follow the
D.C. Circuit’s approach and skip the prima facie case entirely.355 At the
third stage of the test, they could clarify that “pretext” is a term of art,
and disclaim precedents suggesting a plaintiff must prove the
employer’s rationale to be false, since this is inconsistent with but-for
causation.356 They could stop using the “stray remarks” doctrine, and
instead simply apply standard rules of evidence.357 They could also
make clear that evidence of discriminatory bias should be considered
together with evidence undermining the employer’s claimed
rationale.358
And they could completely reject the distinction between socalled “single-motive” cases and so-called “mixed-motive” cases.359
Bostock and other Supreme Court cases make clear that “mixedmotive” claims are cognizable under both a but-for causation standard
and a motivating factor causation standard; the only difference is how
big a role the relevant trait or conduct must play in the decision.360
Relatedly, they could reaffirm that there is no reason to distinguish
between circumstantial evidence and direct evidence; any admissible
evidence can be used to prove a case under either causal standard.361
Any or all of these steps would be an improvement over current
practice.
However, the fact that the Seventh Circuit was willing to suggest
an alternative text-based standard but not disclaim McDonnell
Douglas, and the fact that no circuit has adopted the D.C. Circuit’s
practice with respect to the prima facie case, suggest that without
clear directives from the Supreme Court, many lower courts will feel
bound to apply McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting. The Supreme
Court could make the same reforms outlined above, while still
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See supra text accompanying notes 205–206.
See Brady, 520 U.S. at 494.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.D; see also Sperino, supra note 276, at 57–61.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.D.1.
See supra Part I.D.2.
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retaining the basic framework of McDonnell Douglas as a helpful
mechanism for resolving at least some cases. This would be somewhat
similar to harassment law, where the Supreme Court tried (with
mixed success) to fashion a similar revision of prior doctrine.362
However, McDonnell Douglas has a strong gravitational pull. Even if
the Supreme Court were to reaffirm what the original case itself
asserted—that is, that McDonnell Douglas offers one way, but not the
only way to organize the evidence—it seems relatively likely that
lower courts would continue to default to McDonnell Douglas as the
preferred mechanism to resolve cases. This is essentially what has
happened in the Seventh Circuit. But the Supreme Court also has a
power that lower courts do not. It could simply instruct courts to no
longer employ McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting.
D. STARE DECISIS AND ITS LIMITS
Calling for the Supreme Court to consider abandoning a case
justifiably referred to as “the most important case” in employment
discrimination law363—as well as a significant number of subsidiary
precedents—is no small matter. Adherence with precedent is
foundational to our judicial system. It helps ensure fairness, efficiency,
and predictability in law.364 It is also intended to promote impartiality,
in that law is developed as a shared enterprise rather than according
to the individual predilections of a particular judge. That said, as
developed in the common law context, these values are balanced with
the understanding that it is sometimes appropriate to modify past
rules to reflect changing circumstances or more refined reasoning. In
the statutory context, questions around updating or repudiating prior
precedents are further complicated by the fact that courts are
expounding on language enacted by a separate branch of government.
Both courts and commentators often suggest that precedent in the
statutory context should be subject to an enhanced or “super” stare
decisis.365 This is based on a premise that once a court has offered a
362. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998) (instructing
lower courts to abandon the distinction between so-called “quid pro quo” and “hostile
environment” claims in favor of simply examining whether a plaintiff has been subject
to a tangible employment action).
363. See SPERINO, supra note 25.
364. See generally Widiss, supra note 45, at 867 n.26 (collecting sources discussing
the theoretical rationales for adherence to precedent).
365. See id. at 867–71. That said, it is unclear whether McDonnell Douglas should
be considered a statutory precedent. As Part II makes clear, it is not an interpretation
of statutory language and it is not tied to a particular statute.
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definitive interpretation of the language, Congress has the
opportunity to respond if it disagrees. However, even in the statutory
context, precedent is not set in stone.
The leading explication of when it is appropriate to overrule a
statutory precedent is found in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (itself
an employment discrimination case).366 In Patterson, the Court
identified three factors that can justify overruling: (1) intervening
development of the law has “removed or weakened the conceptual
underpinnings from the prior decision . . . or [] the later law has
rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines
or policies;” (2) the precedent has proven confusing or unworkable;
and (3) the precedent is “inconsistent with the sense of justice or with
the social welfare.”367 The Court also sometimes suggests that
precedents can be properly overruled simply on the grounds that they
are demonstrably erroneous.368
In considering McDonnell Douglas, and the possibility of
abandoning McDonnell Douglas, it may be helpful to distinguish
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting from McDonnell Douglas itself.
That is, the original decision simply articulated a prima facie case of
circumstantial evidence that could suggest discrimination, while also
specifying that it would not necessarily be applicable in all factual
scenarios, and suggested that a plaintiff should have an opportunity to
show that an employer’s claimed justification for an action was
pretextual.369 If McDonnell Douglas were simply cited for these
propositions, it would be unproblematic. But McDonnell Douglas has
come to mean something quite different: a convoluted and technical
doctrine of functionally mandatory elements that has been created by
courts based on close readings of the language of earlier decisions
with minimal or no substantive anchoring in the statutory language
itself. It is this technical paradigm, rather than the initial case, that is a
good candidate for overruling.
As Sections III.A and III.B show, the development and clarification
of causation doctrine—cases that are strictly grounded in the relevant
statutory language, while McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting is not—
has at least considerably weakened the underpinnings of McDonnell
366. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
367. Id. at 173–74 (internal quotations omitted).
368. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87
VA. L. REV. 1 (2001) (describing critiques of this approach but ultimately concluding
there may be some benefits to it as well).
369. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).
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Douglas burden-shifting. If the pretext stage is understood as
requiring a plaintiff to show the employer’s claimed justification is
false, it is effectively a sole-cause standard, not a but-for cause
standard, and thus irreconcilable with the statute. More expansive and
flexible conceptions of pretext may not be strictly inconsistent, but
they are definitely in tension with Bostock and similar cases. Where
there is a tension between a statutory standard and a judiciallycreated doctrine implementing that standard, the separation of
powers and the related concept of legislative supremacy mandates
that the statutory law controls.
Second, as Part II and Section III.C show, fifty years of experience
with McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting establishes that it is
confusing, and arguably unworkable. There is no single consistent
articulation of a “prima facie case,” let alone all the sub-doctrines
embedded in the prima facie case. Even where clear, the test is
repetitive because many of the elements of the prima facie case are
also relevant at the pretext stage. And since its requirements are not
grounded in statutory language, a significant portion of briefs and
decisions are devoted to issues that are (or at least should be)
peripheral to whether a plaintiff can establish liability. This wastes
judicial and litigant resources.
And third, McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting is outdated,
arguably undermining modern senses of justice or social welfare.370
To be sure, the test played an important role in early Title VII
jurisprudence by clarifying that circumstantial evidence could be used
to prove discriminatory bias, and that courts could probe the
legitimacy of an employer’s claimed justification for a challenged
action. But the law, and workplaces, have changed dramatically in the
half century since the decision was issued. As Professor Suzanne
Goldberg has observed, the idea of a “comparator” made much more
sense in (at least some) workplaces of the 1970s with “large,
Tayloresque workplaces, where multiple workers engage[d] in tasks
that [were] susceptible to relatively straightforward comparison.”371
In the modern workplace, hiring criteria and job responsibilities tend
to be much more individualized, making it often extraordinarily
difficult to identify relevant comparators who are deemed to be
sufficiently similarly-situated.
The “protected class” language, and the idea of clearly identifying
who is within or outside a protected class, is premised on a conception
370. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174.
371. Goldberg, supra note 180, at 755.
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of fixed, stable racial, sexual, or other classifications that is
increasingly anachronistic. For example, it is now common for
individuals to claim multiracial identities, and they may shift their
identities in different social contexts.372 Likewise, in the 1970s, it
would have been relatively straightforward to divide individuals into
two groups on the basis of sex. Individuals now identify across a much
more varied range of gender identities, including, at a minimum, men,
women, transgender, and non-binary.373 Moreover, the framework
functionally assumes that discrimination will apply along a single
identity trait—i.e., race or sex. The theory of intersectionality, as
developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw and others, highlights that multiple
facets frequently interact with identity to compound disadvantage.374
Social science confirms intersectional discrimination is very real,375
but courts have struggled to determine how to analyze such claims
within the “protected class” framework.376 If the statute itself included
“protected class” language, courts would need to consider whether—
and how—to apply such language to changing circumstances. But
since the statute references individual traits rather than collective
groups, refocusing on the language of the statute would address these
problems.
IV. TEXT-BASED STANDARD
There is an easy and obvious solution to the problem identified
in this Article. On summary judgment—as at the complaint stage, and
at the jury charge stage—liability should be assessed with reference
to the relevant statutory language. This Part proposes a text-based
standard, discusses which aspects of existing case law developed
under McDonnell Douglas would remain relevant under this standard,
and then provides a detailed example to show how it would differ
from existing practice.
372. See, e.g., David R. Harris & Jeremiah Joseph Sim, Who Is Multiracial? Assessing
the Complexity of Lived Race, 67 AM. SOCIO. REV. 614, 619 (2002) (finding that 12.4% of
all youth provide inconsistent responses to questions regarding racial identity asked
at school and at home).
373. See, e.g., Jessica A. Clarke, They, Them, and Theirs, 132 HARV. L. REV. 894 (2019).
374. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 198, at 144–51 (detailing the interplay
between intersectionality and discrimination).
375. See generally Scheim & Bauer, supra note 7, at 226 (describing an
intercategorical study of intersectional discrimination in “day-to-day” activities).
376. Cf. Frappied v. Affinity Gaming Black Hawk, LLC, 966 F.3d 1038, 1049–51
(10th Cir. 2020) (discussing how the protected class should be defined in a “sex plus”
age claim).
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A. EXPLAINED
When ruling on a motion for summary judgment in a
discrimination claim, a court should simply ask:
Based on the totality of the evidence, could a reasonable factfinder conclude
that it was more likely than not that the plaintiff was subject to an unlawful
employment practice specified in the statute because of a protected trait or
protected activity?377

Courts could use this standard to resolve so-called mixed motive
claims, as well as so-called single motive claims. A court would
consider all admissible evidence without needing to distinguish
between direct or circumstantial evidence, nor between evidence
based on “stereotypes” and other forms of evidence.
Some of the case law and agency guidance developed under
McDonnell Douglas would retain significance, but only where tethered
to the relevant statutory language. For example, courts would no
longer use the “protected class” language; instead, they would simply
assess whether a plaintiff could provide evidence of differential
treatment based on one of the relevant protected traits. In most
instances, the nature of the traits themselves is not at issue in a case.
But courts could reasonably rely on earlier case law establishing, for
example, that an individual who faces discrimination based on being
a member of a Native American tribe can state a viable national origin
discrimination claim,378 or that an individual who faces discrimination
because she is an atheist can state a viable religious discrimination
claim.379 While these decisions may have referenced the “protected
class” language, they are functionally clarifying ambiguous statutory
language and should retain salience under a statutory-focused
standard.
This is likewise true of the case law regarding “adverse action,” at
least to some extent. The primary operative language at issue in most
individual disparate treatment cases under Title VII, 703(a)(1), sets
out particular unlawful practices, such as “discharge” or “[failure] to

377. This is phrased as a general standard that could be used under most
employment discrimination statutes. However, courts would need to be careful to
apply the appropriate standard for unlawful employment practices, recognizing that it
varies based on the statute. See supra text accompanying notes 190–196. Likewise,
under Title VII status-based claims, a plaintiff could ask that the court assess this under
a motivating factor standard rather than a but-for standard. See supra Part I.C.
378. See, e.g., Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power
Dist., 154 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 1998).
379. See, e.g., Young v. Sw. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1975).
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hire”.380 It also proscribes “discrimination with respect to the “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”381 When resolving whether
specific practices—such as a transfer without loss of pay—meet this
standard, courts could properly consider existing case law. However,
they should do so with the recognition that this calls for interpretation
of the relevant statutory language, not simply a free-floating judicial
construct. Courts might be expected to consider whether the
interpretation of that language in Title VII should be consistent with
interpretations of the same or similar language in other statutory
contexts, such as the National Labor Relations Act.382
This same statutory standard could be used to resolve
harassment claims. Indeed, it helps make clear that harassing conduct
is a form of disparate treatment. Under harassment law, an employee
generally must show that she has, because of a protected trait, been
subject to severe or pervasive conduct that is both objectively and
subjectively offensive.383 Courts often treat this standard as a
judicially-created rule, but the initial articulation was grounded in the
statute. The Supreme Court indicated that the severe or pervasive
standard established when harassing conduct was serious enough to
be considered “[discrimination] . . . with respect to [the] . . . terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”384 Reintegrating
harassment into disparate treatment claims would help make clear
that if an employee is subject to epithets or biased comments or
unwanted touching, and also to a termination or other workplace
action more typically recognized as an adverse action, all of the
evidence should be considered together. In other words, the harassing
conduct could and should inform analysis of whether a reasonable
factfinder could conclude the termination was because of a protected
trait. This would be true regardless of whether a court concludes that
the harassing conduct itself meets the (arguably unduly onerous)
severe or pervasive standard.385
380. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
381. Id.
382. See, e.g., SPERINO, supra note 25, at 113–14.
383. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998).
384. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
385. My focus in this article is the fundamental mismatch between McDonnell
Douglas and the statutory language. Since the “severe or pervasive” standard was
grounded in the statute, and the statutory language itself is ambiguous, I think it would
be reasonable for courts to reference existing case law on what constitutes actionable
harassment under the approach I propose. However, I would separately support
judicial or legislative reform to make a broader range of harassing conduct actionable.
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In most cases, the key question would be: has a plaintiff been
discriminated against “because of” a protected trait or protected
activity?386 In general, this would be evaluated under a but-for
standard: could a reasonable factfinder conclude that if the protected
trait were different, or if the protected activity had not occurred, the
outcome would have been different? The key point here is that, as
Bostock and other earlier decisions make clear, the court engaging in
this analysis should recognize that there can be—and often are—
multiple but-for causes of an action and that Title VII and other
employment discrimination statutes simply require that a protected
trait or activity is one of the but-for causes of the action.387 A plaintiff
bringing a status-based claim under Title VII could also request that
the court apply the “motivating factor” standard instead of the “butfor” standard. In that instance, a court assessing an employer’s motion
for summary judgment would simply assess whether, based on the
totality of the evidence, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that a
protected trait was at least a “motivating factor,” without necessarily
resolving whether it rose to the level of a but-for cause.
The various categories of evidence typically advanced to satisfy
elements of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting process could still
be considered, but litigants and courts would no longer be expected to
squeeze them into the steps of the test or be categorically barred from
proceeding if they lack one of the elements. That is, an employer
moving for summary judgment would still generally provide evidence
in support of a nondiscriminatory rationale for its actions. This could
include evidence of the relative qualifications of applicants for a
position, or that the employee engaged in workplace misconduct or
was a poor performer. And a plaintiff, opposing such a motion, would
still marshal evidence supporting her claim that a protected trait was
one of the causes of an action. This could include evidence
undermining the employer’s claimed justification, such as evidence
that a similar-situated employee who differed on the basis of the
relevant trait was treated differently, including experiencing less
punitive action after a similar infraction; that a person involved in the
decision routinely used slurs or relied on stereotypes related to the
trait; or that a supervisor’s attitude to an employee changed when she
learned about a relevant protected trait or activity.
As in any other context, evidence referenced in support of, or in
opposition to, a summary judgment motion should be assessed for
386. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
387. See supra Parts I.D, III.A.
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relevance and ultimate admissibility.388 But courts would not need to
employ any special evidentiary rules specifically because it is an
employment discrimination case. That is, courts would not need to—
and should not—distinguish between so-called “direct” evidence and
“circumstantial” evidence, nor suggest that different legal standards
apply based on the kind of evidence submitted.389 Nor should courts
suggest a plaintiff would need to satisfy a prima facie case with
elements that are not found in the statute. Instead, a court would
simply assess whether, based on the totality of the evidence (and
resolving all genuinely disputed facts in favor of the non-movant), a
factfinder could find that a requisite adverse action happened
“because of” a protected trait or activity.
Some existing case law developed under McDonnell Douglas and
its progeny might be properly referenced to help make such
judgments, but always with an eye towards the relevant statutory
standard, not the body of judge-made doctrine that imposes
substantive requirements beyond what the statute itself requires. For
example, if either party presents evidence of a comparator who was
treated similarly or differently, a court might refer to earlier judicial
decisions suggesting such evidence is more persuasive when the
employees are in similar job positions or have committed infractions
of similar magnitude.390 But under this approach, comparator
evidence would simply be one kind of evidence that could be
considered, rather than—as it is now in many circuits—a prerequisite
to advancing the claim at all.
The stray remarks doctrine should be abandoned entirely.
Instead, courts would simply assess evidence of biased or stereotyped
comments under regular evidentiary rules.391 To be sure, there might
be cases in which a few “stray remarks,” even if assumed to have been
truly uttered, would be insufficient to convince a reasonable factfinder
that a termination or other adverse action was based on a protected
trait or activity. This would be particularly likely if the employer could
provide convincing evidence of a non-biased justification for the
action. In such cases, summary judgment would be appropriately
388. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (“[A] party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular materials in the
record.”); FED. R. EVID. 401 (outlining that evidence is relevant if it tends to make a fact
of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence).
389. See supra Part I.D.2.
390. See, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846–52 (7th Cir. 2012)
(discussing factors that make comparator evidence more persuasive).
391. See Sperino, supra note 276, at 58–62 (proposing this approach).
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granted. However, the evidence itself would still be weighed in the
mix, rather than deemed legally irrelevant.
Most importantly, the case law on the significance of showing
“pretext”—or, more precisely, the case law on the significance of
failing to show “pretext”—should be reassessed. As described above,
McDonnell Douglas and subsequent cases such as Burdine, Hicks, and
Reeves concerned what inferences could reasonably be drawn from
evidence establishing that an employer’s claimed rationale for an
action is not convincing. The Court ultimately held that in most cases,
one plausible inference is that an employer fabricated an excuse to
cover up unlawful bias.392 This reasoning is not specific to McDonnell
Douglas; under a statutory-based standard it is equally true that this
would be a plausible inference to draw from a showing of pretext.393
Thus, in most instances, if a court were considering a summary
judgment motion and the evidence suggests a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the employer’s justification was false, summary
judgment should be denied, even if there was no additional evidence
of discriminatory intent.
However, the corollary is not correct. Under a but-for causation
standard, properly applied, it is irrelevant whether an employer’s
claimed justification is a “true” cause of a decision, so long as the
evidence presented shows a protected trait or protected activity could
also be a cause of the decision. Accordingly, courts should abandon the
idea that failure to prove “pretext” means that a plaintiff cannot
succeed in her claim.
B. APPLIED
To illustrate how this standard would operate, and how it differs
from existing practice, it is helpful to flesh out the example presented
in Part I of a pregnant employee who is fired shortly after making a
workplace mistake. Let us call this employee Anne, and specify that
she is an accountant. She is fired by her employer in December. After
discovery, the employer moves for summary judgment on Anne’s sex
discrimination claim. The key facts include:
392. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147–49 (2000)
(“[D]iscrimination may well be the most likely alternative explanation [to the
employer’s justifications,] especially since the employer is in the best position to put
forth the actual reason for its decision.”).
393. In this respect, I disagree with some criticism of McDonnell Douglas, which
has argued that inference is unwarranted or that the focus on pretext is an improper
distraction from assessing whether one of the causes of a challenged action was
discriminatory bias. Cf. Tymkovich, supra note 328, at 522 (making this argument).
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In July, five months prior to the termination, Anne informed her
boss that she was pregnant with her second child. The next day, she
was entering her boss’s office and overheard him on the phone saying,
“And now that she’s pregnant again—.” At that point, he saw her and
abruptly stopped the conversation.
In August, four months prior to the termination, Anne’s boss
transferred three of her major accounts to different accountants.
In October, two months prior to the termination, Anne walked
into the breakroom for lunch. One of her coworkers told her they were
all just taking bets on whether Anne would come back after her
parental leave, and asked her if she wanted to go in on the pool. Anne
got very upset, and said of course she was coming back. Her coworker
said, “That’s what girls always say, but then they find out that two kids
is more than twice the work.” Anne’s boss laughed along with
everyone else.
In December, Anne made a mistake on a significant report. This
was the first time she had made this kind of error. Unfortunately, it
was sent to the client, who complained. Anne was fired. This was a few
weeks before her baby was due.
There are two potential comparators. One is Beverly, a woman
with no children. Beverly is an analyst rather than an accountant, but
she also reports to Anne’s boss. In the prior year, she made a serious
mistake in a presentation to a client, but she caught the mistake
herself and corrected it. She was not penalized. Indeed, her boss
patted her on the back and said, “Everyone makes mistakes. As long as
you learn from this, and don’t make the same mistake again, you don’t
need to worry.”
The second potential comparator is Caleb, a male accountant who
also reported to the same boss. He was fired the year before for
making a mistake similar to Anne’s. Discovery reveals, however, that
Caleb had made that kind of mistake repeatedly. Two months before
his termination he had been put on a performance improvement plan
and warned that if he continued to make errors, he would be
terminated.
Under McDonnell Douglas and its progeny, the evidence in this
case would likely be analyzed in several separate tests—”sliced and
diced”—to use Professor Michael Zimmer’s term.394 As a first step,
Anne would need to make out her prima facie case: that she was a
“member of a protected class,” that she was “qualified,” that she was
394. Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61
LA. L. REV. 577, 596 (2001).
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subject to an “adverse action”, and that a similarly-situated person
outside her protected class was treated differently.395 The first
element is straightforward; she is a woman. Moreover, since Congress
amended Title VII to specifically indicate that pregnancy is a form of
sex discrimination,396 pregnant women are often treated as a distinct
“protected class.”397 Regarding the adverse action, the termination
would clearly be sufficient, but the transfer of accounts would not be.
She would probably be deemed “qualified,” in that she meets the
objective requirements for the position, but the employer might
challenge that point since it asserts that she is being terminated for a
serious workplace mistake.
If this were being litigated in a circuit that requires a comparator
as part of the prima facie case, the parties would spend a significant
portion of their briefs arguing whether Anne could meet this
requirement. Anne would point to Beverly, whose mistake had been
treated as a learning opportunity, rather than cause for termination.
First, a court would need to resolve whether Beverly is “outside”
Anne’s “protected class.” Although they are both women, pregnant
women are considered a distinct protected class; thus, Anne would
probably be held to satisfy this threshold requirement, but the parties
would both likely feel they had to at least address it. The harder
question would be whether they are similar in other relevant respects.
The seriousness of their errors was similar, but Beverly caught the
mistake herself, whereas Anne’s was discovered by a client who
complained. Also, they have the same supervisor but different job
titles. Under existing case law, these factors might or might not be
deemed dispositive, depending on how exact a similarity the relevant
circuit requires.398 Likewise, the company would claim it was treating
395. See supra Part II.B.
396. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
397. See, e.g., Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cline
v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[P]regnancy
discrimination under Title VII [requires showing] ‘(1) she was pregnant, (2) she was
qualified for her job, (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and
(4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision.’’’).
398. Compare, e.g., Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (“So long
as the distinctions between the plaintiff and the proposed comparators are not ‘so
significant that they render the comparison effectively useless,’ the similarly-situated
requirement is satisfied.”) (citation omitted), with Lewis v. City of Union City, Ga., 918
F.3d 1213, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2019) (explicitly rejecting the Seventh Circuit’s
“effectively useless” standard on the ground that it “departs too dramatically from the
essential sameness that is necessary” and adopting instead a requirement that the
comparators are “similarly situated in all material respects”).
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Anne the same as Caleb, who was male, to help bolster its claim that it
had not discriminated. This would lead to a dispute over the
significance of the fact that this was Anne’s first mistake of this kind,
whereas Caleb had made similar errors repeatedly.
After having argued all of these points, both parties would likely
conclude that it was at least possible that Anne could satisfy the prima
facie case. Accordingly, they would work through the rest of the
burden-shifting process. The employer would easily meet its burden
of articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale: Anne made a
serious mistake and a client complained.
At the pretext stage, Anne would not be able to satisfy the
standard formulation, which would require her to prove that the
claimed justification is “false.”399 It is not false. She made the mistake.
Moreover, it is reasonable to believe that her mistake may have been
a precipitating cause in her being fired. This section of the brief would
repeat many of the arguments made above, in reference to the
comparators, as the company tried to prove that it was simply
enforcing a sex-neutral employment policy.
Since Anne would not be able to establish the employer’s
rationale was pretextual, she would try to assemble evidence that
could persuade the court that the action was nonetheless motivated
by a “discriminatory reason.”400 She would reference the incident in
the breakroom, overhearing her boss on the phone sounding unhappy
about her pregnancy, and the fact that her boss took away her key
accounts soon after she announced her pregnancy. But all of this
evidence would likely be brushed aside as “stray remarks”401 that are
insufficient to support a claim of discrimination. The phone call and
the transfer of the accounts were several months before the
termination. Moreover, while she heard her boss referencing her
pregnancy in the phone call, the words she heard were not clearly
biased. As far as the breakroom incident, her boss (the decisionmaker)
did not even make the relevant statements. If Anne were to try to claim
that the breakroom incident, on its own, constituted harassment, she
would fail; a single incident of off-color joking would not be
considered sufficiently “severe or pervasive.”402
399. See supra Part II.C.
400. See supra Part II.D.
401. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
402. See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1993) (specifying
that courts should assess the frequency and severity of the conduct and whether it is
physically threatening or humiliating, but that a “mere offensive utterance” will not
meet the standard).
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In other words, under McDonnell Douglas and related subdoctrines, the court would almost certainly grant summary judgment
to the employer. Anne would lose her case.
But should she? Looked at as a totality, the evidence shows that
as soon as Anne told her boss about the pregnancy, he started to treat
her differently. She overheard him on the phone sounding unhappy
about the second pregnancy and he abruptly ended the call as soon as
he saw her. Shortly afterward, he took away three of her most
important accounts. He did nothing to stop her coworkers from
speculating about whether she would come back from parental leave.
Rather, he joined them in laughing at the idea that she would. And
when she made a mistake—admittedly a true mistake—she was fired,
right before she was due to go out on leave. While another accountant
had been fired for a similar offense, he had already been put on a
performance improvement plan, while this was Anne’s first error of
this kind. It seems relatively obvious that, when all of the admissible
evidence is considered together, a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that but-for her pregnancy, she would not have been fired.
In other words, under a standard based on the statutory language,
summary judgment should be denied.
Altering the facts, however, shows summary judgment would still
be possible in many cases. On this version of the facts, assume this was
not Anne’s first mistake of this kind. Rather, assume she had made
similar errors repeatedly. Then in June, before she announced her
pregnancy, Anne was placed on a performance improvement plan and
warned that if she made another serious error, she would be
terminated. This was standard company policy; the same process was
used with Caleb, ultimately leading to his termination.
On this alternative version of the facts, it would be reasonable for
a judge to conclude that—even considering the evidence suggesting
Anne’s pregnancy concerned her supervisor—no reasonable jury
could conclude that her pregnancy caused the termination. If she had
not made the mistake, but still had been pregnant, she would not have
been fired. Indeed, her boss’s statement to Beverly (that what was
important was that she learn from the mistake and not repeat it)
actually bolsters the employer’s claim that it is applying a policy
evenhandedly. Employees are warned the first time they make a
mistake of this kind, but if they continue to do so, they are put on a
performance improvement plan and may be terminated.
Note that even under a motivating factor standard, at least partial
summary judgment would be available on these alternative facts.
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Under that standard, it would probably be appropriate for a judge to
hold a reasonable factfinder could conclude her pregnancy was a
“motivating factor”403 in the termination. In other words, maybe her
pregnancy, and her boss’s concern that she would not come back from
leave, played at least some role in his decision to fire her. Moreover,
from a policy perspective, Anne’s boss should be told that he should
not take adverse actions against an employee because she is pregnant,
and he should try to stop—rather than join in—a conversation
suggesting pregnant women or new mothers are insufficiently
committed to work. But this does not change the evidence discussed
above that suggests a reasonable jury would also conclude she would
have been fired anyway, even if she had not been pregnant.
On these facts, a judge might properly deny summary judgment
on liability, but grant summary judgment on the same-action defense.
As a practical matter, the case would then likely settle for a relatively
low amount, as the basis for a significant share of money damages
would disappear.404 The employer would probably refuse to admit
liability, but hopefully its in-house counsel would realize it should
provide additional training on pregnancy discrimination. Thus, Title
VII’s larger remedial purposes would be advanced.
CONCLUSION
This Article exposes fundamental tensions between the judgecreated burden-shifting process used to resolve most employment
discrimination cases, and the prohibition on discrimination found in
the statutes themselves. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must
first satisfy a prima facie case that includes elements with no
grounding in the statutory language, and then show that an
employer’s claimed rationale for its actions is pretextual. The process
is premised on a (generally erroneous) assumption that there will
only be a single cause of a challenged act—either a legitimate nondiscriminatory rationale or unlawful bias—and that shifting
evidentiary burdens between the plaintiff and the defendant can
ferret out the “true” reason for the employer’s action.
The statutory language, however, simply requires a plaintiff to
prove that a protected trait or protected activity was one of the causes
of the employer’s action. Under the statutory language, it should be
403. See supra Part I.C.
404. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (providing injunctive and declaratory relief
and attorney’s fees might be available but precluding recovery of back pay and most
other economic damages).
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irrelevant whether legitimate factors play a role in the decision, so
long as a factfinder could conclude a proscribed factor made a
difference in the outcome. Relatedly, under the statute, there is no
reason—and no basis—to distinguish between so-called “mixedmotive” and so-called “single-motive” cases.
There is a simple solution to this problem. Courts should assess
the evidence in discrimination cases according to the language
Congress chose: can a plaintiff prove that an unlawful act happened
“because of” a protected trait or protected activity? While McDonnell
Douglas may once have been a helpful tool, it has developed in ways
that undermine the transformative promise of antidiscrimination law.
Discrimination should be defined, and proven, by the text.

